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The ADA's Revolving Door:
Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm
BONNIE PoTRAS TUCKER*
The American with Disabilities Act (ADA) was premised in many ways on the
traditional model of the civil rights statutes. Because this model does not serve to
provide equal opportunities for people with disabilities, Congress expanded it by
requiring that reasonable accommodations be provided for individuals with
disabilities. Professor Tucker looks at this expansion and discusses the
underlying conflict between this expansion and the civil rights premise.
Professor Tucker discusses how it may have been better for Congress to
premise the ADA on more basic "human rights" principles rather than the
stated civil rights principles. She also discusses court cases that have slowed the
progression of the positive ramifications of the ADA for individuals with
disabilities. The real change in the treatment of people with disabilities, she
suggests, will come from educating not only the courts but the public-at-large on
the true meaning of civil rights for people with disabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress first began considering passage of the bill that became the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),1 I have struggled with the
premises underlying the civil rights paradigm of the ADA. As a person with a
disability by any reasonable definition of that term (I have been profoundly deaf
since infancy and have never been able to benefit from hearing aids), I became a
willing convert to, and ultimately an avid supporter of, the concept of "civil
rights" for people with disabilities. Frustrated with being repeatedly excluded
from mainstream society,2 I was more than ready to embrace any concept that
would open society's doors to me and other people with disabilities. I was all too
willing to jump on the bandwagon to support the passage of a law requiring
"equal rights" for people with disabilities similar to laws requiring "equal rights"
for members of minority races.
I did not come to this bandwagon lightly. I had spent more than forty years
struggling to adapt as a lone deaf person in this hearing world (I do not use sign
language, but lip-read, and I did not get to know another deaf person until I was
in my mid-to-late thirties). My entire life had been premised on the belief that the
disability was mine, and thus it was my responsibility to compensate as best as
* B.S. Syracuse University 1961; J.D. University of Colorado 1980; Professor of Law,
Arizona State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors Ruth Colker,
Adrienne Asch, and Hannah Arterian for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2 One who is deaf inevitably suffers from such exclusion on a daily basis. 'See, e.g.,
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possible for that disability. Society was not responsible for my deafness, and thus
society was not responsible for changing the world to meet my needs. All the
adapting was my responsibility. Who said life was supposed to be fair? In short, I
had spent over forty years wholeheartedly supporting the "medical model" of
disability, under which the focus is on "rehabilitating" or changing the person
with a disability rather than on changing society.3
As more and more commentators began to reject the medical model of
disability and to look at disability in the context of a social problem that society
as a whole should bear responsibility for rectifying, I became persuaded-
indeed, I wanted to be persuaded-to accept that reasoning. After all, the
disability was no more my "fault" than it was society's "fault." Why should all
responsibility relating to that disability be mine alone, not to be shared by
society? Why not do what is required to open mainstream society to all people,
with and without disabilities, rather than requiring people with disabilities to do
the impossible by seeking to "correct" uncorrectable disabilities? Why not at
least try to create Utopia?
Although I came to recognize the need for, and to support, the concept of
civil rights for people with disabilities, I remained somewhat skeptical about the
prospects for success of a civil rights movement aimed at providing individuals
with disabilities with equal rights and opportunities. Utopia sounded wonderful,
but I questioned whether the public at large would accept the notion of redefining
and reorganizing society to make it truly accessible to people with disabilities.
While I believed that a majority of people would find the general concept
acceptable, I was skeptical as to whether most people would pay more than lip
service to that concept when confronted with the reality that creating Utopia
would require them to spend money or take action that might disrupt their daily
lives. Desperately desiring admission to mainstream society, however, I resolved
to be optimistic. We would have a law that required people to pay the necessary
expenses and take the necessary actions to create a world accessible to everyone,
3 See, e.g., Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213 (2000); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cipples,
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy
for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993). 1, like many other people with
disabilities, had steadfastly rejected the "charitable model" of disability, under which people
with disabilities are viewed as helpless and in need of charitable intervention and/or patronage
to survive. See, e.g., SUsAN NUSSBAUM, MISHUGANIsMO, Scene 3, reprinted in STARING BACK:
THE DiSABILmY EXPERIENCE FROM THE INsIDE OUTr, 375 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) ("Disabled
people aren't brave to wanna live their lives, they're just sick of holding that tin cup out all the
time."); 136 CONG. REC. H4627 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (Representative Oberstar, speaking in
favor of the ADA's enactment, noted that "the disabled do not want charity or a government
handout; they want to work").
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at least within the bounds of reason. The courts would be required to enforce that
law and ultimately we would create some reasonable version of Utopia.
Ten years after enactment of that law-the ADA-a reasonable Utopia has
not yet been created. As some of us had feared,4 many individuals and entities
are not yet willing to spend money or disrupt their lives to benefit someone or
some group other than themselves.5 The ADA was enacted ahead of its time, in
4 See 2 BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDsTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERsONs WITH
DIsABILrrIs: AN ANALYSIS OFFEDERALLAW 21:3 n.11 (1991).
5 An illustrative situation is found in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of
Administration, 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995), where the court refused to require an
employer to pay $150 to renovate a sink to permit its use by a disabled employee; the state
defendant preferred to spend thousands of dollars on litigation rather than to renovate the sink.
It is not surprising that people who are "strangers" to disability reject the notion that some
facets of society must bear the cost or inconvenience of making society accessible to people
with disabilities. I sometimes tell the following story to students in my disability law class:
About three years ago I bought my mother two tickets to see the play "Bye Bye Birdie' for her
birthday. The friend my mother had planned to take to the play canceled about two weeks
before the performance, which was being staged at a state university theater. I had never really
seen a play before, due to the inability to lipread what the performers are saying on the stage-
even if I sit front and center the actors are usually too far away, often do not face the audience
but face the co-actors with whom they are speaking, and often have microphones blocking their
lips. (I had sat through a couple of plays when my physical presence was required for political
reasons, but had never been able to follow or enjoy the performance.) I thought this might be a
good opportunity to see how ADA Title I was working while at the same time keeping my
mother company at the play. So, I asked the theater manager if the theater would provide me
with an oral interpreter for the performance. The manager was very cooperative. I met with a
technical employee of the theater, and we tried to figure out where the oral interpreter would sit
and how she would orally interpret in the dark We came up with several possible scenarios,
which I left to the theater to choose from, and I told my mother I would accompany her to the
play. My mother wanted to know how this was going to work. "Who would pay for the
interpreter?" asked my mother. "The theater," I replied. "How much would that cost?" queried
my mother. "Probably about $60," I opined. "Where will the interpreter sit?" asked my mother.
"There are several possibilities, but probably she will sit on the seat on one side of me, while
you sit my other side." I replied. My mother was aghast. "You paid about $50 for your ticket to
the play," Mother said. "Now you are telling me that the theater owner has to pay an interpreter
$60 dollars for you to hear the play, and the interpreter will occupy another $50 seat. That
means that the theater is losing $60 dollars due to your attendance at the play. What kind of a
law is that?" remarked Mother. I tried to explain to my mother that the $110 cost to the theater
was not to be compared to the $50 1 had paid for my ticket, but was to be factored into the
theater's entire revenues and viewed in the context of one item in the theater's overall costs of
doing business. But my mother, who has two deaf children and whose husband became deaf at
the age of fifty, so she is no stranger to disability, did not find that logic palatable. And I have to
admit that, although I attended and enjoyed the play, I felt so uncomfortable about requiring the
theater to go to that expense on my behalf that I have not been to another play since. If my
mother is aghast, and I am uncomfortable, how can we expect "strangers" to disability to accept
the principles upon which the ADA is premised?
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
that much of the country is not yet ready to embrace the precepts on which the
ADA is premised. And the ADA has not yet succeeded in requiring many people
and entities to do what they do not wish to do-for one primary reason: many,
perhaps most, courts are not enforcing the law, but instead are finding incredibly
inventive means of interpreting the ADA to achieve the opposite result that the
Act was intended to achieve.6 Judges are only people, generally people without
6 There are a vast number of law review articles discussing the disappointing "failure" of
the ADA to achieve its goals to date. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited"
Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL L. REV. 409, 415 (1997) (discussing
the courts' misconstruction of the ADA's definition of disability and the manner in which such
decisions represent a "considerable journey down the wrong road"); Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,
100 (1999) (noting that the overwhelming number of cases filed under ADA Title I have been
decided in favor of defendants on motions for surmaryjudgment); Ruth Colker, ADA Title III:
A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EM. & LAB. L. 377 (2000) [hereinafter Colker,
Fragile Compromise] (noting that ADA Title M has proven largely ineffective because (i) it
provides only for injunctive relief, and thus few lawsuits have been brought under Title m, and
(ii) those courts that have heard cases under Title Hl have heavily favored defendants and have
narrowly interpreted the rights of people with disabilities under the Act); Matthew Diller,
Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19
(2000) (noting that ADA Title I has not accomplished its goals, and suggesting possible
reasons for the fact that court decisions have heavily favored plaintiffs-often for nonsensical
reasons); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect
to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997) (discussing the courts' restrictive
interpretations of the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of the term "disability," and
stating that such restrictive judicial interpretations "reflect, at best, a lack of understanding of
the statute and, at worst, a blatant hostility towards" the ADA's goals); James P. Colgate, Note,
If You Build It, Can They Sue? Architects'Liability under Title III of the ADA, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 137 (1999) (discussing the manner in which the trend toward judicial backlash against the
ADA has impacted the issue of architect liability under the Act). See also Kathym Moss, et al.,
Outcomes ofEmployment Discrimination Charges Filed under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1028, 1034 (1999) (presenting results of a comprehensive
research study that showed that the vast majority of employment discrimination charges filed
under ADA Title I were not resolved in favor of the plaintiffs).
With respect to articles discussing the extremely large percentage of reported cases that
have been decided in favor of ADA defendants, however, it is important to note, as Professor
Colker has explained, Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the ADA, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 239
(2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning], that analyzing the issue by looking to reported cases
alone maybe misleading. Reported cases are generally appellate cases, not trial court cases, and
defendants may only rarely appeal trial court verdicts in favor of plaintiffs due to the difficulty
of showing that a jury's verdict was clearly erroneous. The reported cases, therefore, do not
necessarily evidence the number of instances in which plaintiffs have prevailed at the trial level
in ADA cases. Cf Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative
Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (May-June 1998)
(reporting that a study of over 1,200 ADA Title I cases undertaken by the Commission on
[Vol. 62:335
ADA & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM
disabilities, who are not yet willing to change the rules of society to require
themselves or others to act as good Samaritans. Unless a law clearly and
emphatically states that people must act as good Samaritans, most judges will not
interpret that law to require such action. The ADA appears to waffle on this
point, and thus gives the courts sufficient leeway to reject the real principles
upon which the Act was founded and to interpret the Act in a manner that is in
accord with the courts' own values or beliefs.
Many different factors have been suggested as explaining the so-called
"backlash" against the ADA. Some of these factors are based on economics; 7
others are based on a variety of social concepts, ranging from outright judicial
and societal hostility toward civil rights premises in general8 or to the ADA's
premises specifically,9 to the inability of courts to understand the law,10 to
fundamental differences between the judiciary and the legislature relating to the
role the government should play in this area,11 to a belief by the judiciary and the
public-at-large that people with disabilities who seek accommodations are
'narcissistic and egoistic,"' 2 to a miscellany of other factors. Each of these
suggested factors has undoubtedly contributed to the backlash. While
tangentially addressing the issue of judicial backlash against the ADA, this paper
is more concerned with inherent flaws in the ADA that provide the courts with a
means of exercising that backlash.
It is easy and uncomplicated to "blame" the fact that to date the ADA has not
achieved the goal of creating a generally accessible mainstream society on the
failure of the courts to properly enforce the law. A more fundamental problem,
however, may lie in the ADA itself-in the seemingly conflicting premises
underlying the Act and the Act's failure to straightforwardly present its
objectives. The ADA was artfully drafted, through a series of negotiations and
compromises, in a highly charged political atmosphere. 13 To ensure passage of
Mental and Physical Disability Law of the American Bar Association showed that employers
prevailed in 92% of final judicial dispositions of such cases).
7 See, e.g., Marta Russell, Backlash Can Be Reasonably Attributed: Backlash, the
Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 335 (2000)
(suggesting that the backlash with respect to the employment provisions of the ADA is due to:
(1) the fears of nondisabled workers that they will lose their jobs due to an influx of new
workers with disabilities into the workforce, and (2) the unwillingness of business entities to
pay the costs of accommodations for workers with disabilities).
8 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., Mayerson, supra note 6.
10 See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 6.
11 See, e.g., Colgate, supra note 6.
12 Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 197(2000).
13 See, e.g., NAnoNAL COUNCIL ON DIsABILrTY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE
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the ADA, straightforwardness and clarity ultimately gave way to political reality,
requiring some disingenuousness. The result of this necessary political
maneuvering and disingenuousness was enactment of a law that many courts
view as sending conflicting messages. The courts, in turn, have chosen to
prioritize the message that comports with their own notions of fair play and to
ignore the message that contravenes those notions.
This article will address the apparently conflicting premises underlying the
ADA. In Part I.A, I will address the apparent conflict between the traditional
concept of civil rights on which the ADA was modeled and the ADA's core
requirement of reasonable accommodations, and provide examples of judicial
decisions weakening or denying enforcement of the ADA that may reflect the
courts' discomfort with those seemingly contradictory objectives. In Part I.B, I
will address the reasons that the "race neutral" concept of civil rights laws is
inapplicable to most cases involving different treatment of individuals with
disabilities, and provide examples of the manner in which the "neutrality" model
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has had an adverse impact on the ADA
discrimination claims of individuals with disabilities. In Part aI, I will discuss the
positive effects resulting from the ADA, despite the Act's fundamental flaws,
and offer some words of caution to prevent further backlash against the Act in
general and people with disabilities in particular. In Part IV, I will conclude.
I. THE ADA's SEEMINGLY CoNFLICTING PREMISES
The ADA purports to be a civil rights law; it was premised on the concept of
civil rights for individuals with disabilities.14 The Act was enacted both pursuant
MAKING OF THE AMERICANS wrh DIsABimEs Acr (1997) [hereinafter EQUALrrY OF
OPPORTUNrrY]; Chai Feldblum,4 Medical Examinations and Inquiries under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521 (1991); Colker, Fragile
Compromise, supra note 6, at 385. See also Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1991) (noting that the bill
introducing the ADA "underwent much debate, negotiation, compromise, refinement, and
revision before emerging in its final form," that the ADA "has been significantly modified
since its original introduction," and that while "[m]any of those changes were for the better,
some were not" ).
14 See, e.g., EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 13; Feldblum, supra note 13,
Weicker, supra note 13. Thus, the ADA was referred to as the "Emancipation Proclamation"
for people with disabilities, and the Act's date of enactment was referred to as "Liberation Day
for the Disabled." See e.g., A.Z. Horvath, Disabled-Rights Bill Praised and Feared, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 9, 1989, at 2 ("Senate lead sponsor Tom Harkin (D. Iowa) called the [ADA] a '20th-
century Emancipation Proclamation for people with disabilities"); G. Elsasser, Senate Oks
Rights Bill for Disabled, CHI. TRm., Sept. 8, 1989, § 1, at 1 (the ADA "is 'a 20th-century
Emancipation Proclamation for people with disabilities,' said Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), the
bill's chief sponsor"); S. Chapman, Waving a Magic Wand at the Needs of the Handicapped,
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to Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate
Commerce Clause15 to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against people with disabilities. ' 16 The entire
focus of the Act is on equalizing the playing field for people with disabilities, so
that people with disabilities have the same opportunities to participate in
mainstream society as do people without disabilities. The ADA is not just a basic
civil rights law, however. The term "civil rights," as that term has traditionally
been defined and interpreted, is a misnomer in the context of the different
treatment faced by people with disabilities.17
The ADA expanded the scope and principles of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability by recipients of federal financial assistance. 18 Section 504 was
premised in large part on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-a law that
already existed to prevent employment discrimination on the basis of race by
recipients of federal financial assistance. 19 The ADA was premised in part on
section 504 (and thus on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act): when enacting the
ADA Congress borrowed the definition of disability utilized under section 504
and also borrowed some of the substantive provisions and defenses developed
under that section.20 The ADA was also premised, in part, on Titles 1121 and
VII22 of the Civil Rights Act: Congress extended coverage of the ADA to the
CHICAGO TRmuNE, September 24, 1989, § 4, at 3 (the ADA has been dubbed "Liberation Day
for the disabled").
15 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
16 § 12101(bXl).
17 As two commentators have noted, "[m]any perfectly just claims ... are NOT civil
rights claims." MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LEsTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS wrrH LEARNING DIsABIInEs 226 (1997).
18 Section 504 provides in pertinent part that:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by
reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI provides that:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under anyprogram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'
20 Id.
21 § 2000a (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national
origin in specified places of public accommodation).
22 § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating in matters of employment on
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private sector, as under Civil Rights Act Titles H1 and VII, and incorporated the
Title VII remedies into ADA Title I. Congress also modeled Title III of the ADA
after Title R of the Civil Rights Act-both Titles prohibit discrimination by
public accommodations. When enacted in 1964, Titles I, VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act focused on prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,23 although
all three titles also prohibited discrimination on the basis of color, religion, or
national origin, and Title VII contained a "token" (at that time) prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex.24 To the extent that the ADA was modeled on
the Civil Rights Act, the focus was on the Civil Rights Act's prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of race.25
Professor Matthew Diller explains the reasons for premising the ADA (and
presumably section 504) on the Civil Rights Act prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of race as follows: (1) the Civil Rights Act provided an existing
vocabulary and frame of reference upon which to base a law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability; (2) the civil rights framework gives
nondisabled people a means of comprehending the problems faced by people
with disabilities resulting from stereotypes and biases; (3) the civil rights
framework establishes the concept of discrimination, under which it is
impermissible for certain entities to act upon biases or stereotypes; (4) the civil
rights model provides a judicial means of remedying discriminatory conduct; (5)
use of the civil rights model allows people with disabilities to assert their claims
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
23 See generally CHARLEs WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGIsLATwE HISTORY OF THE CPL RIGHTS AcT (1985).
24 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort & Holly L. Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law,
78 OR. L. REV. 27, 28 (1999) (referring to the "the last minute amendment offered by an
opponent of the [Civil Rights Act] adding 'sex' to the list of protected classifications [in Title
VII] in an apparently satirical attempt to make the legislation unacceptable to the majority of
legislators") (citing W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY, SEX DISCR MATION IN EMPLOYMENr (1981));
Francis J. Vass, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 431,441 (1966);
accord EQuALrrY OF OORTuNrrY, supra note 13, at 10.
25 See, e.g., EQUALrrY OF OPPORTuNrrY, supra note 13, at 10-11. The National Council
on Disability's summary of the enactment of the ADA notes that "[t]here would be no ADA
were it not for the successful protests of African Americans, for their crowning achievement in
the Civil Rights Act was also the philosophical foundation of the ADA." Id. at 11. Indeed, the
legislative history of the ADA is replete with analogies between discrimination on the basis of
race and discrimination on the basis of disability, see, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong. 22, 99, 189 (1989) [hereinafter ADA: Hearings], but similar
analogies between discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimination on the basis of
disability are not made. As stated by Senator Kennedy, "The ADA is carefully crafted to give
disabled persons the same protections from discriminations that apply to racial minorities, no
more, no less." Id. at 189.
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in the form of actual rights rather than policy preferences; (6) because the Civil
Rights Act already established statutory protections prohibiting discrimination
due to biases and stereotypes, it could be claimed that by simply expanding these
existing protections to cover people with disabilities the ADA was not intended
to be overly disruptive or intrusive; and (7) use of the civil rights model would
not require significant federal spending-a politically significant point given the
problem of budget deficits when enactment of the ADA was at issue.26
Unfortunately, while at the time it made good sense to model the ADA on
existing civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, for
two primary reasons use of the civil rights framework may have ultimately
served to hamper, rather than to promote, achievement of many of the Act's
goals.2 7
A. Civil Rights and the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement
The first reason that use of the civil rights model may have served to hamper
rather than promote the ADA's goals lies in the apparent conflict between the
traditional concept of civil rights and the reasonable accommodation requirement
that is the core of the ADA's legislative scheme.
The ADA's proponents were-and are-careful to highlight not only the
differences between the "civil rights" and "medical" approaches to dealing with
the problem of disability, but the differences between the "civil rights" and
"charitable" approaches. According to the Act's proponents, the ADA is not
about giving charity to people with disabilities. The ADA's supporters continue
to emphasize that people with disabilities do not want to be viewed as inferior or
incapable citizens requiring patronization and pity. People with disabilities do not
seek handouts or charity from others, nor do they seek to be awarded special
favors or entitlements (indeed, the term "disabled" is used in the ADA rather
than the previously used term "handicapped," because the term "handicapped"
was viewed as describing one who held his cap in hand, asking for charitable
assistance). To the contrary, people with disabilities seek only to be treated in the
same manner as people without disabilities are treated. They seek to be placed on
2 6 Diller, supra note 6, at 35-37. The ADA exceeds the protections of section 504 in that
it prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by the private sector and does not attach any
funding strings. See id at 37.
27 Although this article discusses only two reasons that use of the civil rights framework
may have ultimately served to hamper achievement of the ADA's goals, there are additional
reasons that the traditional civil rights model is inappropriate in the context of disability
discrimination. Those reasons include, inter alia: (1) the diversity of the members of the
minority class protected by the ADA; (2) the permeability and changeability of the members of
that class; and (3) the individualized approach required to eliminate discrimination on the basis
of disability. Time and space constraints preclude discussion of these matters in this article.
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equal footing with people without disabilities-to be neither inferior to nor
superior to nondisabled people. In short, they seek nondiscrimination. This is the
basis of the traditional civil rights approach.
The problem with applying this traditional civil rights approach in the
context of discrimination on the basis of disability is that in most cases treating
people with disabilities in the same manner as people without disabilities serves
to exclude people with disabilities from mainstream society, rather than to
include them in mainstream society. As an individual who is deaf, I offer just a
few obvious examples: If I am permitted to enroll in a regular school program
alongside hearing peers but am not provided with "different" treatment to assist
me in understanding what is said in the classroom, I am excluded from, rather
than included in, the educational system. IfI am given the same opportunities as
my hearing peers to attend a movie, have a telephone and make and receive calls,
attend a lecture or play, watch a television show, participate in or observe a court
proceeding, but am not provided with "different" treatment to assist me in
hearing what is said on the phone or television or at the play, movie or court
proceeding, I am excluded from, rather than included in, those activities. Simple
equal treatment does not result in my inclusion into mainstream society. To
achieve that goal, I need to be treated differently from, not equally to, my hearing
peers.
The ADA recognizes this need for different treatment, of course, and thus
requires that "reasonable accommodations" be provided for qualified individuals
with disabilities.28 In this regard the Act appears contradictory. As a civil rights
law the ADA purports to require equal treatment for people with disabilities. In
recognition of the fact that equal treatment does not lead to inclusion in the
mainstream for many people with disabilities, however, the ADA requires
different treatment for people with disabilities. The ADA gives recognition to the
incontrovertible fact that to provide individuals with disabilities with equal
opportunities the civil rights model must be amended or expanded to incorporate
the concept of accommodations. The ADA's proponents did not, and do not,
view the "equality" and "reasonable accommodation" precepts as being
contradictory. To the converse, the reasonable accommodations to be provided
for individuals with disabilities were, and are, considered to be an inherent part
of the civil rights framework on which the ADA is based. Following that
reasoning, the reasonable accommodations mandated by the ADA were not, and
are not, viewed as constituting "affirmative action."
Defining the concept of "affirmative action" is a complex issue, however.2 9
28See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999) (explaining the
"reasonable modification" requirement under Title DI); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (1994).
29 As the Supreme Court noted in an early case interpreting section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act-the predecessor to the ADA (see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994))-it is not
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Technically, a primary difference between affirmative action and reasonable
accommodations is that the former looks to remedy past discrimination, while the
latter looks to remedy immediate or prospective discrimination. While
affirmative action gives preferential status to one group of people, reasonable
accommodations do not give people with disabilities preferential status, but are
provided to equalize the playing field for those requiring the accommodations.
Looked at in this sense, the provision of reasonable accommodations differs from
traditional affirmative action principles. That is not to say, however, that the
provision of reasonable accommodations does not constitute some form of
affirmative action. If we require a provider of telecommunication services to pay
for and provide me with additional equipment or services-not provided to
people who can hear-to enable me to understand what is said on the telephone,
we are requiring that entity to take affirmative steps for my benefit. If we require
an employer to pay for and provide me with an interpreter so I can perform a job,
a theater to pay for and provide me with an interpreter so I can watch a play, and
a hotel to pay for and provide me with special equipment so I can make
telephone calls, then we are requiring those entities to take affirmative steps for
my benefit. We are requiring these entities to spend money and/or reorganize
their policies to treat me differently-that is, to take affirmative action on my
behalf (which action is labeled as "reasonable accommodations" under the
ADA). This is not the same type of affirmative action as, for example, requiring
an employer to give affirmative preference to me, or any other person with a
disability, in the hiring or promotion process, 30 but, while it may differ in shape,
always easy to define the line between the illegal refusal to make reasonable accommodations
for qualified people with disabilities and the legal refusal to provide affirmative action for such
individuals. See Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979). See also
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,299-302 (1985).
30Thus, the "affirmative action" provided me does not have a "reverse discrimination"
effect on nondisabled people in the same manner that affirmative action on the basis of race is
contended to have a reverse discrimination effect on individuals of the majority race.
The only situation in which the ADA arguably places an individual with a disability in a
preferred position is that involving the suggested reasonable accommodation of reassigning a
current employee who becomes unable to perform his or her current position due to a disability
to a vacant position for which that employee is qualified. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). In
that situation the employee with a disability may be given preferential status over another
applicant for the vacant position at issue. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d
1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that under ADA Title I an employee with a disability is
entitled to be reassigned to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation even if another
applicant is better qualified for that vacant position). Many courts, however, have not accepted
this principle, but, to the contrary, have very narrowly defined the reasonable accommodation
concept in the area of reassignment. See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700
(5th Cir. 1995); Fussell v. Ga. Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1569-71 (S.D. Ga. 1995). The
courts are divided on this issue.
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it is nevertheless one form of affirmative action.31
The desire to characterize reasonable accommodations and affirmative
action as completely separate concepts32 is understandable. Defining the
provision of reasonable accommodations as a form of affirmative action is
troubling because that definition reinforces the incorrect assumption that by
being provided with such accommodations I am somehow being placed in a
superior position to others.33  In actuality, however, the reasonable
accommodations provided for my deafness, while permitting me to participate in
mainstream society in instances in which I would not be able to participate absent
those accommodations, usually do not even serve to place me in a position that is
equal to the position held by my hearing peers.
By way of example, while my employer may provide me with a TDD so that
I may use the telephone, and while I may use a relay service provided pursuant to
the ADA to enable me to talk on the telephone with people who do not have
TDDs, use of the telephone via TDD and a relay service does not, by any stretch
of the imagination, equal use of the "regular" telephone system. Utilizing a relay
service is a very artificial means of using the phone, since an intermediary does
the actual talking or typing for the recipient, and thus the individual speaking is
not able to provide her own emphasis or mannerisms and easy "give and take" of
conversational flow is prohibited. One cannot interrupt during a relay call since
one must wait for a message from the relay operator saying "go ahead" (GA)
before responding. Further, relay calls take at least three times as long as voice
31 Other commentators have previously reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 DUKE L.J 1, 14 (1996) (noting that the provision of reasonable accommodations constitutes
"affirmative action, in the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual's
disabilities and to provide special treatment to him for that reason").
32 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REv. 123, 147-50 (1998) (stating
that affirmative action and the provision of reasonable accommodations "differ in degree and
characte').
33 The first time I requested an accommodation due to my deafness was when I asked to
be provided with the assistance of student notetakers for my law school classes. I was not able
to understand anything that was said during my law school classes, in part because of the
Socratic method of teaching. The students taking notes for me provided me with four to five
pages of handwritten notes. (I had tried taping the classes and having a secretary transcribe the
tapes, but each class required the secretary to type between 30 and 40 pages, which would take
hours-sometimes days due to the difficulty of replaying the tape to hear what was said-and
proved to be much too expensive. Unfortunately, I went to law school before the concept of
real time transcription was developed.) Despite the fact that I was only provided with a very
brief summary of the subject matter discussed in classes, and thus I still missed most of what
was said in the classroom, at least a few of my fellow law students were convinced that I was
receiving a special advantage. Tucker, supra note 2, at 123-53.
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calls, privacy is prohibited, relay operators frequently miss part of the message
they are supposed to relay, and relay operators are unable to type fast enough to
make calls for a deaf caller using the new voice mail systems where a menu is
typed requesting the caller to push a button to reach the appropriate department
(it often takes four phone calls just to have the menu relayed to the deaf caller!).
Similarly, while I may be provided with an interpreter to permit me to
understand what is said at a meeting or function, communicating via an
interpreter does not, by any stretch of the imagination, equal the ability to
communicate without an interpreter. Instead of looking at the speaker, I am
forced to watch the interpreter, thus losing valuable eye contact with the person
who is speaking. Interpreters sometimes miss what the speaker says, or I might
miss something the interpreter tries to interpret due to the difficulty of intently
concentrating for long periods of time. Even a slight lag time between the time
the speaker speaks and the time the interpreter relays the message may prevent
me from asking a question or making a comment at an appropriate time. Most
importantly, however, the interpreter can only interpret what the main speaker is
saying; it is not possible for her to interpret side comments or comments made by
various people-often by several people speaking at once-during a
presentation. Thus, I miss the infrequent jokes or asides that are very important if
one is to become a real part of the group. Finally, the interpreter's presence is off-
putting to others. Because I am sitting with the interpreter and watching the
interpreter other individuals often feel that they are precluded from speaking with
me. Using an interpreter on the telephone presents even greater problems. I am
never free to make a phone call at whim when and where I wish to. I must always
find the interpreter, assuming she is at the office at her desk (and is not on break
or in the restroom or has not left for the day), and go through the time-consuming
process of getting ready to make an interpreted call. The lack of privacy is
extremely frustrating--even if the call is not confidential it is not pleasant to
have someone sitting across from you listening to every word you say or that
others say to you, and sometimes inadvertently expressing silent disapproval.
While these types of accommodations make it possible for me to integrate in
some aspects of mainstream society they do not serve to "equalize" the playing
field between me and people who can hear. Certainly they do not place me in a
position of superiority to my hearing peers.34 Consequently, the reasonable
accommodations provided to me are liberating albeit somewhat limiting.
Nonetheless, the question that remains to be answered with respect to those
accommodations is: How is asking entities to pay for and provide services or
equipment for me that is not paid for and provided to others distinguishable from
asking these entities to provide me with a form of special entitlements or special
34 It is unfortunate that nondisabled people sometimes do not recognize this reality. See,
e.g., supra note 33.
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favors? I do not think it is distinguishable. I think that is exactly what I am doing.
And I think that the entities covered by the ADA think that is what I am doing,
and the courts think that is what I am doing.35
It is true, of course, that society-at-large will benefit from the integration of
people with disabilities into mainstream society, particularly into the
workforce.3 6 An employer benefits from the services of a wide variety of
employees, and society benefits from the taxes of employed people with
disabilities and the fact that working individuals with disabilities need not be
supported by the taxpayers via government assistance. Society-at-large benefits
from the integration of people with disabilities into all aspects of mainstream
society. Two examples serve to illustrate this point: When an interpreter is
provided to enable a student who is deaf to communicate in the classroom,
hearing members of the class also benefit from the deaf student's participation.37
When an individual who is deaf is provided with a TDD and use of a relay
service, not only does the deaf person benefit by being able to use the phone but
35 Some commentators argue very persuasively that this concept of "special assistance" is
fictional, and that the cost of equipment to enable a person with a disability to participate in a
program or job is no different than the cost of other equipment to be utilized by everyone.
Professor Adrienne Asch, for example, wrote this author:
Why do I have more "right" to the content of a play because I can hear it with my own ears than
you do if an interpreter or real-time captioning exist in the world? Why should not the cost of
plays for the general public include some built-in cost for the occasional interpreter, as they
include the cost for heat, light [and] luxurious seating material? If you answer that [the latter]
things benefit everyone, and the interpreter benefits only the occasional deaf person, you will be
accurate; but why do you, as a human being alive in the world with money to spend and
intellect to use, deserve any less chance at what technology and institutional arrangements can
create?... Are you less of a human being and a member of the moral, human, social
community because you have a disability?... [W]hy should we force people to live always
observing what they cannot have, even though the means are available for them to have it?
Letter from Adrienne Asch to Bonnie Poitras Tucker [hereinafter Asch Letter] (on file with the
author). While I agree in theory with the sentiments and concepts expressed by Professor Asch,
society-at-large and the courts are not yet willing (and may never be willing) to accept the
practical realities involved in implementing those concepts. For further discussion of this issue,
see infra note 103.
36 See, e.g., PETER DAVID BLANCK, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
EMERGING WORKFORCE: EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION § 13.3 (1998)
(discussing some workplace benefits resulting from the provision of reasonable
accommodations for employees with disabilities). The ADA itself notes that unnecessary
discrimination and segregation of people with disabilities "costs the United States billions of
dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(9) (1994).
37 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
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hearing people who want or need to communicate with that deaf person also
benefit by being able to talk to the deaf person on the phone.
However, these benefits to society-at-large are merely tangential. They are
not the major focus of the ADA, nor should they be. The hearing students will
suffer little detriment if a small number of deaf students are not able to
participate in class discussions-those hearing students are still able to benefit
from the contributions of the overwhelming majority of their classmates.
Similarly, hearing people will suffer little detriment if the few deaf people they
want or need to communicate with must communicate via mail, fax, computer, or
on a person-to-person basis rather than via the telephone-those hearing people
are still able to use the telephone with the overwhelming majority of the
population.
Indeed, even the public benefits reaped by the ADA's mandate against
employment discrimination on the basis of disability may be relatively minimal.
Many people with very severe disabilities are unable to work because there are
no reasonable accommodations that will enable such individuals to enter the
workforce. The fact that the ADA has not led to an increase in the number of
people with disabilities in the workforce 38 may be due to the relatively small
number of people with disabilities who are able to benefit from ADA Title I. The
public benefits from taxes paid by disabled employees and a reduced number of
people with disabilities who are supported by state or federal governments may
thus be fewer than originally hoped or expected.39 But debating this issue at this
juncture is somewhat futile, for the extent to which society-at-large will benefit
from the inclusion of people with disabilities in mainstream society is not the
crux of the matter. Rather, the crux of the matter is contained in the following
two elementary precepts.
First, it cannot be fairly disputed that the primary beneficiaries of the ADA
are people with disabilities. I am the primary beneficiary of the affirmative steps I
am asking entities covered by the ADA to take on my behalf. I am the primary
38 A 1998 study, for example, found that the proportion of working-age adults with
disabilities who are employed has declined, rather than increased, since 1986. 1998 NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION ON DisABwmrr/Louls HARRIS & Assoc. SURVEY OF AMERICANS wrrH
DISABILITIES, ExECUTIvE SUMMARY, at http'J/www.nod.orgfpresssurvey.html (July 23, 1998).
See also Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 271 (2000) (noting that there has been an overall decline in labor force participation for men
with disabilities since 1990). But see Paul Steven Miller, The EEOC's Enforcement of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in the Sixth Circuit, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 217, 219-21
(1998) (stating, to the converse, that since passage of the ADA more people with disabilities
have entered the workforce).
39 This discussion is outside the scope of this article. The point I am making here is that
benefits to society-at-large resulting from the anti-discrimination mandates of the ADA are
tangential benefits, and not the primary purpose for enactment of the ADA.
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beneficiary of the interpreter needed to allow me to see the play, the additional
equipment and services necessary to allow me to use the telephone, and any
accommodations my employer must provide to enable me to perform my job.
Second, and perhaps more important, the ADA intends for those affirmative
steps to primarily benefit me and other people with disabilities. The Act's
repeatedly stated purpose is to alleviate the difficulties people with disabilities
face in attempting to integrate into mainstream society.40 Any tangential benefits
that result to society-at-large are simply an added bonus.
When enacting the ADA, Congress determined that to provide individuals
with disabilities with civil rights and equality of opportunity, entities covered by
the Act must be required to provide such individuals with some form of special
treatment-analogous to "special favors" or "entitlements." Congress determined
that the provision of reasonable accommodations is necessary to foster the goal
of enabling people with disabilities to integrate into mainstream society. And the
ADA provides that this special treatment must be paid for and provided by
certain segments of our society, including employers,41 owners and operators of
places of public accommodations,42 providers of telecommunications services,43
40 The "findings" section of the ADA outlines the various forms of discrimination faced
by people with disabilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2), (3), (5), (7) (1994), and states that,
"unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis
of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination." § 12101(a)(4).
The same section provides that "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably
famous...." § 12101(a)(9). Accordingly, the Act provides that its stated purposes are to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities" and "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."
§ 12101(b)(1), (4). Timothy Cook, who was heavily involved in promoting passage of the
ADA, wrote eloquently of the benefits that would result from the ADA's mandate to fully
integrate people with disabilities into mainstream society. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEM. L. REV. 393, 448-56 (1991). All of
the benefits discussed are benefits to people with disabilities themselves.
The ADA's proponents, however, discussed the Act's potential benefits to the public-at-
large as a means of drawing support for the Act's enactment. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. S9530
(daily ed. July 11, 1990) (Senator Durenberger, in support of the Act's passage, contending that
enactment of the ADA was critical to the country's economic future). The ADA's finding that
the dependency and nonproductivity of people with disabilities resulting from discrimination is
costly, see supra note 35,s results from such testimony.
41 §§ 12111-12117.
42 §§ 12181-12189.
43 Title IV of the ADA amends the Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C.
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and state and local government entities.44 With the exception of the costs to be
borne by state and local government entities (and in that context by society as a
whole), Congress has determined that these specified segments of our society are
to bear the cost, as part of their overall business expenses, of the special
treatment necessary to allow individuals with disabilities to take part in
mainstream society.45
The underlying principle of the ADA is that people with disabilities must be
fully integrated into society-that we must recognize the potential of all
members of society, disabled or not, even though it may cost money or impose
some burdens upon covered entities to reach this objective. Thus, for example,
Senator Paul Simon stated during congressional hearings on the ADA that
Congress was finally going to do the "right and decent thing" by enacting the
ADA despite the costs that would be incurred as a result.4 6 Senator Bob Dole,
acknowledging that the ADA would place "some burdens" on the business
sector, stated that such burdens were justified because the ADA would "make it
much easier" for Americans with disabilities. 47 And upon signing the Act,
President Bush stated that the administration was "committed to containing the
costs that may be incurred [as a result of the ADA's enactment]. '48 Congress and
the Executive branch clearly recognized the costs and burdens to be incurred as a
result of the ADA's enactment Thus, for example, the National Council on
Disability's comprehensive report on the enactment of the ADA notes that "[t]he
most controversial issue in the redrafting stage [of the ADA] was the cost and
burden imposed upon covered entities."49 Nonetheless, Congress and the
§ 225(a)(3) and (b) (1994).
4442 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (1994). Of course, benefits provided by state and local
government entities are paid for by the taxpayers-in other words, by society in general.
45 Some commentators are of the opinion that these expenses should be borne by society
as a whole in the form of a general tax, rather than by specific segments of our society. See,
e.g., RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINsT EMPLOYMENT
DIsCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992); Carolyn Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in
Federal Disability Policy, in DIsABmITY AND WORK: INCENTVES, RIGHTS, AND
OPPORTUNITIES 3, 3-17 (Carolyn Weaver ed., 1991). And, as noted previously, the expenses
mandated by ADA Title II, which requires state and local government entities to pay for and
provide reasonable accommodations to permit integration of people with disabilities into their
programs and activities, are borne by the taxpayers, and thus the public-at-large.
46 ADA: Hearings, supra note 25, at 22.
47 Knocking Down a Barrier, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk Edition News), July 27,
1990, at 7.
48 john W. Mashek To Cheers, Bush Signs Rights Law for Disabled, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 27, 1990, at4.
49 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 13, at 100.
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Executive branch concluded that those costs and burdens must be imposed in a
manner that provides equal opportunity to all individuals with disabilities.50
Unfortunately, the ADA does not directly address the seeming conflict
between traditional civil rights principles of equality and the provision of
different treatment to accommodate individuals with disabilities. The legislative
history of the Act, the Act itself, and the Act's implementing regulations, speak
of equal rights, of civil rights, and of eliminating discrimination against people
with disabilities51 in a fashion analogous to the manner in which discrimination
on the basis of race is eliminated. The Act imposes a "reasonable
accommodation" requirement on covered entities, but does not state forthrightly,
in its preamble or elsewhere, that the provision of such accommodations
constitutes a necessary form of special entitlements, or an expansion of
traditional civil rights principles. Instead, the Act speaks solely about
"nondiscrimination," and the drafters and supporters of the Act contend that the
reasonable accommodations that must be provided to achieve such
nondiscrimination do not constitute a form of special entitlements.
Use of the nondiscrimination terminology, and the tactical decision that the
ADA would not speak of accommodations in terms of special entitlements or
special treatment, was obviously necessary from a political perspective. To make
the ADA palatable to the business sector, the states, and ultimately our
representatives in Congress who are responsive to the concerns of their
constituents, the ADA had to be framed in such a manner that it did not seem
overly disruptive or intrusive. It is highly unlikely that Congress could have been
persuaded to enact a law that outspokenly required the business sector and state
and local governments to provide special entitlements to people with disabilities.
The ultimate objective of the ADA, however, is just that. That the ADA labels
the requisite special treatment as traditional nondiscrimination does not change
the fact that more than traditional nondiscrimination is being required of entities
covered under the ADA.
50 Thus, for example, Congress refused to amend Title I of the ADA to impose a
proposed ten percent salary cap on the extent of accommodations a covered employer must
provide an employee, because such a cap would discriminate against individuals with low
paying jobs. See id. at 159.
5 1 Thus, the purposes of the ADA are stated as being:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; ... and (4) to invoke
the sweep of congressional authority... in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
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While the goal of equality is the same under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the ADA, the means by which equality is to be achieved under the two Acts are
very different. Many courts are troubled by this contradiction between the
traditional civil rights label given the ADA and the affirmative action obligation
imposed by the Act which vastly exceeds the traditional nondiscrimination
mandate of the civil rights laws the ADA purports to emulate.
Numerous decisions weakening the ADA or finding ways to deny
enforcement of the ADA appear to reflect the courts' discomfort with these
seemingly contradictory statutory objectives. The courts either do not
understand, or do not accept, the concept of reasonable accommodations as a
necessary component of the civil rights premise underlying the ADA. Rather, the
courts view the reasonable accommodation requirement as an additional step that
must be taken by covered entities, which goes above and beyond the provision of
traditional civil rights. In particular, judicial decisions severely limiting the scope
of the ADA, such as those in which the courts have drastically narrowed the
definition of a person with a disability warranting the protections of the Act,52 are
probably the result of the courts' reluctance to impose what they view as wide-
spread affirmative action responsibilities on specific entities under the guise of a
traditional civil-rights/nondiscrimination mandate. Other examples of judicial
decisions that are likely the result of this reluctance include cases in which the
courts have significantly limited the circumstances under which the ADA is held
to apply. I will cite just a few examples by way of illustration.
52 Such cases include the recent Supreme Court decisions of Sutton v. United Airlines
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that a determination of whether an individual has a
disability within the meaning of the ADA must be made in light of mitigating factors that may
ameliorate the effects of the disability), Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S' 516,
521-22 (1999) (holding that an individual is "regarded as" being substantially limited in the
ability to work, and thus disabled, only if that individual is regarded as unable to perform a
class ofjobs using his or her skills in the geographical location to which he has access), and
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that the determination
of whether an individual is disabled under the ADA must be made in light of the individual's
physical or mental ability to compensate for a physical impairment). These three decisions have
very drastically limited the number of people considered disabled and, thus, deserving of the
protections of the ADA. This author discussed the ramifications of these cases in a paper
presented at a symposium at the University of Alabama Law School in March, 2000, which
will be published in the University of Alabama Law Review. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The
Supreme Court's Definition of Disability under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 321 (2000). Accordingly, these cases will not be discussed in this article.
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1. Cases in Which the Courts Have Narrowed the Circumstances under
Which ADA Title IIApplies53
ADA Title II provides, inter alia, that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."5 4 Title II was enacted to
ensure that people with disabilities are provided with the "different" treatment
necessary to ensure that they are treated in an equivalent manner to people
without disabilities with respect to the services and programs of state and local
government entities. Equivalency is the key. Since equal treatment of people with
disabilities often leads to unequal results, different treatment is required to ensure
equivalent results.55 Many courts, however, obviously troubled by this concept of
53 One burgeoning issue in this regard involves the question of whether Congress validly
exercised its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment when it waived states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the ADA. The courts have been divided on this issue. A few
courts have held that Congress's waiver of states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in
the ADA did not constitute a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus states are immune from suits for damages under the ADA. See, e.g.,
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Northeastern Ili. Univ., 207 F.3d 945
(7th Cir. 2000); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999). Still other
courts have held, to the contrary, that ADA Title II constituted a valid exercise of Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus states are not immune from suits for
damages under Title H1. See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir.
1999); Dare v. State of Cal. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); Martin v.
Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 1999); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1999); Fla.
Dep't of Corrections v. Dickson, 157 F.3d 908 (1lth Cir. 1998); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136
F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997). It was hoped that
the Supreme Court would clarify the split among the circuits this year. The Court granted
certiorari in both the Dickson and Alsbrook cases, but the cases both settled before the Court
could hear or decide the matter. Subsequently a writ of certiorari was granted in part in Garrett,
and it is expected that the Court will decide this issue next term. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000). (As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided
Garrett. 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700 (Feb. 21, 2001)).
In holding that Congress did not have authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to
waive states' sovereign immunity to suits under the ADA, the Seventh Circuit in Erickson
relied heavily on the fact that "[t]he ADA goes beyond the anti-discrimination principle... "'
Erickson, 207 F.3d at 951. The court explained clearly that the ADA is not merely an
antidiscrimination statute, but goes beyond that purpose in requiring that covered entities take
affirmative steps to accommodate persons with disabilities. ,Id. It can only be hoped that the
Supreme Court will not follow similar reasoning when the Court finally renders a decision on
this question.
54 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
55 See generally, 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104-35.178 (1999) (the DOJ's regulations enacted
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different treatment to ensure equivalent results, have found numerous ways to
narrow the scope of ADA Title II. One vivid example is found in judicial
decisions holding that ADA Title II does not apply to the conduct of police in
making arrests. 56
Suppose that state police arrest an individual who is deaf and communicates
only via American Sign Language (ASL).57 Because the deaf individual is
unable to understand or communicate with the police officer, he may have no
idea what is happening to him. As a result, the deaf individual may suffer severe
anxiety, will be unable to explain events or circumstances explaining why the
arrest may be inappropriate, and his failure to speak or incomprehensible efforts
to sign may be viewed as constituting hostile or uncooperative behavior. The
following two real life situations serve to illustrate this point.58
A deaf driver was pulled over by the police for committing a minor traffic
violation. As the police approached the stopped vehicle they observed beer cans
in the back of the car and thought they had probable cause to believe the driver
might be intoxicated. While still standing behind the car the policemen ordered
the driver to exit his vehicle with his arms over his head. Being unable to hear the
policemen, the driver did not exit the car. The policemen, therefore, pulled the
driver out of the car and twisted his arms behind his back, dislocating his
pursuant to Title II); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS wrrH DisAB=rrIs Acr TrrTLE II
TECENICALASSISTANCE MANUAL (1993) [hereinafter DOJ, MANUAL].
56 See, .g., Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that
to hold that arrest procedures fell within the ambit of ADA Title II would constitute "a stretch
of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent!'); Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (stating that "an arrest is not the type of service,
program or activity from which a disabled person could be excluded or denied the benefits,
although an ADA claim may exist where the claimant asserts that he has been arrested because
of his disability (i.e., he has been subjected to discrimination)").
57 American Sign Language (ASL) is a completely different language from English that
has its own grammar and syntax and is based on the use of signs representing a limited number
of primarily concrete terms. See, e.g., J.K. Kresse & P. Kleven, Deaf People and Sign
Language Interpreters in Court: A Booklet for Bench and Bar 4, 11 (1981) (explaining that
ASL is a "complete language which is separate and not dependent upon English for its
meaning and bears no structural resemblance to English," and noting, for example, that ASL
qualifiers generally follow rather than precede the noun as in English, events are normally
placed in chronological order, cause and effect relationships are generally stated in the form of
rhetorical questions, and conditional phrases are usually placed last in a sentence). The
differences between English and ASL may be illustrated by two examples: A person signing or
writing in ASL might state "your true most need tell me must," while an English speaking
person would state "you must tell me what you really need most"; a person signing or writing
in ASL might ask'"touch San Francisco already you?" while an English speaking person would
ask "have you been to San Francisco?"
58 These examples are taken from Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: Time to
Be Heard, 22 LOy. OF L.A. L. REv., 1, 3-4 (1988).
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shoulders. After explaining to the policemen via gestures that he was deaf, the
driver was taken to the police department for a breath test. He was handed the
breathalyzer equipment and told to "blow." Unfortunately he did not blow hard
enough and thus he was orally instructed to blow "harder." The deaf man did not
comprehend the abstract term "harder,"59 and thus failed to follow instructions.
Accordingly, the police reported that the deaf driver "refused to take a breath
test," and, pursuant to applicable law, his license was revoked for six months.60
Late one evening two men were observed by a policeman to be fighting in
the street. The policeman broke up the fight and attempted to question the two
men. Because one of the men was deaf and communicated solely via ASL, the
policeman was unable to communicate with that man. Based upon the hearing
man's version of the fight, however, the policeman arrested the deaf man for
assault and placed him in the local jail.61
In both of these situations, once the police officers became aware the
individuals were deaf, the deaf individuals needed to be provided with the
"different" services of qualified ASL interpreters to ensure that the treatment
they received by the police was "equivalent" to the treatment hearing people
received by the police. This is precisely one form of affirmative conduct required
by Title II to accomplish the goal of nondiscrimination. 62 The only explanation
for judicial decisions holding to the contrary lies in the reluctance of those courts
59 The term "hard" represents something concrete, such as a rock. To the converse, the
term "harder," as in "blow harder," represents an abstract concept. Such abstract concepts are
often unfathomable to deaf persons who communicate in ASL, which is based on a limited
number of signs representative of a relatively small number of concrete words.
60 Reported by Helen Young, nationally certified interpreter for the deaf, Phoenix,
Arizona.
6 1 Id. After spending the night in jail the deaf man attended a preliminary hearing before
the local magistrate, accompanied by a qualified ASL interpreter. After listening to the deaf
man's side of the story the magistrate dismissed the charges against him.
A similar problem sometimes occurs when two drivers, one hearing and one deaf and a
user of ASL, are involved in a car accident. Often the police ticket the deaf driver based on the
one-sided "facts" provided by the hearing driver, who is the only person the police officer is
able to communicate with. Id.
62 Other courts, therefore, have recognized that the conduct of police in making arrests
clearly falls within the ambits of ADA Title II. See, e.g., Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 913
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding that an arrestee with paraplegia stated a claim under ADA Title II
relating to the manner in which he was transported from the site of arrest to the police station);
People v. Long, 693 N.E.2d 1260, 1262-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that Title 11 applied to
plaintiff's claim relating to arrest by police but finding that Title II was not violated); Barber v.
Guay, 910 F. Supp. 790, 802 (D. Me. 1995) (finding that Title II applies to claims of
individuals with disabilities relating to arrest by police); Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, 3
Am. Disabilities Cas. 1366, 1371 (D. Me. 1994) (holding that defendants' claim that ADA
Title II did not apply to arrest situations was "plainly wrong").
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to recognize that ADA Title I[ imposes affirmative requirements on state and
local government entities that go beyond the simple civil-rights/equal-treatment
premise of the Act. To hold, as did the court in Patrice v. Murphy,63 that ADA
Title I[ only applies in an arrest situation when the claimant alleges that he has
been arrested because he is disabled, defeats the purpose of that Title. No police
officer is likely to arrest an individual because he is deaf, or because he has some
other disability. Rather, the more likely form of discriminatory police conduct in
the context of an arrest is the police officer's failure or refusal to affirmatively
provide accommodations for a disabled arrestee or potential arrestee to ensure
equivalent treatment of that individual. 64 Some courts, however, are not willing
to require state entities to engage in such affirmative conduct.
2. Cases in Which the Courts Have Narrowed the Scope of ADA Title I
Courts have been especially ingenious in devising means of limiting the
scope of ADA Title I's prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of
disability. Again, I will cite just one example-that being judicial decisions
dealing with the issue of necessary reasonable accommodations that might
conflict with applicable collective bargaining agreements.
ADA Title I prohibits employers, employment agencies, labor organizations,
or joint-labor management committees from discriminating on the basis of
disability.65 To prevent such discrimination, all entities governed by Title I must
provide reasonable accommodations for qualified employees or applicants with
disabilities. 66 Title I, and the EEOC's regulations promulgated thereunder,
63 43 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
64 An analogous situation is found in the judicial decisions initially holding that ADA
Title II does not govern the activities of state and local correctional (prison) facilities. See, e.g.,
Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997); White v.
Colorado, 82 F.3d 264 (10th Cir. 1996); Pierce v. Assistant Superintendant King, 918 F. Supp.
932 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Staples v.
Va. Dep't of Corr., 904 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1995). Fortunately, that reasoning was
overturned by the Supreme Court's ruling in Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v.Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206, 209 (1998). Note, however, that on remand the lower court found that the plaintiff
prisoner, Yeskey, was not disabled under the ADA and thus could not invoke the Act's
protections. Yeskey v. Commonwealth, 76 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577-78 (M.D. Pa., 1999).
65 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994).
66 § 12112(b)(5) (1994). The term "reasonable accommodations" is described in the
EEOC's Title I regulations as: (1) "[m]odifications or adjustments to a job application
process... to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the
position held or desired is customarily performed," or (2) a modification or adjustment that
allows a disabled employee to enjoy the same benefits and privileges enjoyed by non-disabled
employees, as long as such modification or adjustment does not impose an undue hardship on
the employer's business. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1999).
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suggest several "reasonable accommodations" that covered entities may provide
for employees with disabilities. 67 The crucial issue is whether a proposed
accommodation to permit an employee with a disability to perform a job is
"reasonable." Suppose the proposed accommodation conflicts with the terms of
an otherwise applicable collective bargaining agreement. Is that accommodation
"reasonable," or does it constitute an "undue hardship" on the covered entity's
business, which renders the accommodation unreasonable?68
When enacting the ADA, Congress intended that a collective bargaining
agreement should not necessarily serve as a defense to an employer who fails to
accommodate an employee with a disability as required by ADA Title I. The
legislative history of the ADA notes that "if a collective bargaining agreement
reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be
considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation
to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to that job. However,
the agreement would not be determinative on the issue."'69 That report further
notes that "if the collective bargaining agreement lists job duties, such a list may
be taken into account in determining whether a given task is an essential function
of the job. Again, however, the agreement would not be determinative on the
issue."70
In accord with this legislative intent, the EEOC recognizes that the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement may be relevant in determining whether a
proposed accommodation is reasonable, but that the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement would not be dispositive of the issue.71 Further, because
both labor unions and employers are subject to the nondiscrimination/reasonable
accommodation mandate of Title I, the Senate Labor Committee Report on the
6742 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) and (B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (1999). The
suggested accommodations include, but are not limited to: (1) "[m]aking existing facilities
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;" (2) job restructuring (by
reallocating or redistributing non-essential job functions); (3) development of part-time or
modified work schedules; (4) reassignment to a vacant position when accommodation vithin
an employee's current job cannot satisfactorily be made; (5) acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices; (6) modification or adjustment of examinations, training materials or
policies; and (7) the provision of qualified readers or interpreters for employees who are blind
or deaf. Id.
68 An accommodation is not reasonable if it constitutes an "undue hardship" on the
employer's business. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994).
69 H.R REP. No. 101-485, at 63 (1990), (emphasis added); reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
7 1 See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM., A TECHNICAL ASSsTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROvIsIONs (TILE 1) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILmES
AcT §§ 1-3.9(5), 1-7.1 l(a) (1992) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICALASSISTANCE MANUAL].
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ADA suggested that, to avoid conflicts between provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement and an employer's obligations to provide reasonable-
accommodations for employees with disabilities, collective bargaining
agreements negotiated after the July 1992 effective date of ADA Title I should
"contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions necessary to
comply with" the ADA.72
Despite the mandate that both labor unions and employers comply with
ADA Title I, and despite the clear statements of legislative intent that proposed
accommodations that conflict with applicable collective bargaining agreements
are not to be considered per se unreasonable, the courts have repeatedly held that
an accommodation is automatically unreasonable if it would violate the rights of
other employees under an applicable collective bargaining agreement. 73 The
courts seem to disregard altogether the need for unions to comply with the ADA,
but, instead, hold collective bargaining agreements sacrosanct-and safely
removed from the long arms of the ADA. In short, the courts are not willing to
recognize (much less enforce) Title I's requirement that employers and labor
unions take affirmative steps-including modifying relevant collective
bargaining agreements-to eliminate the unequal status of people with
disabilities in the workplace.74
An employer might, of course, justify its refusal to unilaterally disregard a
collective bargaining agreement to provide an accommodation for a disabled
employee on the ground that such action would be held to violate the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).75 That does not excuse the joint obligation of
employers and labor organizations to agree on appropriate reasonable
accommodations for employees with disabilities, however. Moreover, why is it
automatically assumed that the NLRA should take priority over the ADA? A
court could just as easily hold that an employer who refused to provide an
72 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989). See also EEOC TECHNICAL ASSiTANCE MANUAi,
supra note 71, at § 1-7.11 (a) (discussing that report).
73 See, e.g., Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051-52
(7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995);
Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Town of Seymour, No. 3:95
CV1538, 1998 U.S. District LEXIS 676 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 1998).
74 Indeed, in some cases courts have simply noted that the union has not waived the
provision at issue in the applicable collective bargaining agreement, without even mentioning
the union's obligation to make reasonable accommodations under ADA Title I. See, e.g.,
Kralik, 130 F.3d at 81. I suspect that many courts may erroneously view such an
accommodation as placing an employee with a disability in a "superior" position to other
employees, by virtue of the fact that the employee with a disability would not have to comply
with the same rules under the collective bargaining agreement.
75 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1994).
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accommodation for a disabled employee has violated the ADA as the court could
hold that the unilateral provision of such an accommodation violated the NLRA.
The majority of courts, however, automatically give preference to the NLRA
over the ADA, perhaps because costs or burdens may be incurred, or "special
treatment" may be provided, when an employer complies with the ADA but not
when the employer complies with the NLRA, or perhaps simply because the
court is not enamored of the ADA's precepts. This is another example of a
situation in which the courts are not willing to look beyond the stated civil-
rights/equal-treatment premises of the ADA.
3. Cases in Which Courts Have Narrowed the Scope of ADA Title ll
Courts have also been ingenious in finding means to limit the coverage of
ADA Title I. A significant means by which courts have accomplished this
objective, as discussed later in this paper,76 is by holding that Title Ill applies
only with respect to the physical premises of public accommodations, but not to
the programs or activities of such public accommodations. Another example of
the means by which courts have limited the applicability of Title III is found in
cases holding that architects are not subject to the mandates of that Title.77
ADA Title Ill provides, inter alia, that:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 78
The term "discrimination" in Title Ill is defined as including, inter alia, "a
failure to design and construct facilities.. . that are readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities, except where an entity can demonstrate
that it is structurally impracticable [to meet such accessibility requirements]"7 9
The latter proviso specifically applies to those sections of Title IR such as the
section quoted above, relating to those who own, lease (or lease to), or operate a
place of public accommodation (collectively known as "public
accommodations"), and to those sections of Title III relating to "commercial
76 See infra text accompanying notes 138-51.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Days Inns of Am., 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. 491,494 (1998);
United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998); Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers, P.C., 945 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996),
aff'd., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
78 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
79 § 12183(a)(1).
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facilities," 80 which are defined in Title III as, inter alia, facilities whose
operations will affect commerce. 81
In recognition of Title Il's prohibition against the design and construction of
inaccessible facilities, the Department of Justice (DOJ), charged with
responsibility for enforcing Title Ia has consistently held that architects can be
held liable for violating ADA Title In. 82 Nevertheless, some courts have held
that architects cannot be held liable under Title IlI for the failure to design and
construct accessible facilities, because the Title II language pertaining to design
and construction applies only to those that are public accommodations (i.e., those
who own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation), and architects are
not public accommodations. 83 Those courts disregard the fact that the statutory
language pertaining to design and construction specifically states that it applies to
the conduct of both public accommodations and commercial facilities. 84
Such reasoning, of course, ignores the statutory language specifically
applying the mandate pertaining to accessible design and construction to
commercial facilities.8 5 More importantly, such reasoning serves to limit the
circumstances under which ADA Title ll applies,8 6 and actually permits the
design of new facilities that are not accessible to people with disabilities-in
direct contravention of Title Ili's purpose. The courts applying such reasoning
seem troubled by the ADA's mandate that affirmative steps be taken to ensure
that newly constructed and altered facilities are designed and built in such a
manner so as to be fMlly accessible to people with disabilities. These courts view
this "affirmative action" mandate as going beyond the traditional civil-
80 Section 12183(a) defines "discrimination" as that term is to be "applied to public
accommodations and commercial facilities."
81 See §§ 12181(2), 12183(a). Only those provisions of Title M requiring that newly
constructed or altered facilities be accessible to persons with disabilities apply to commercial
facilities that are not also public accommodations. The intent was to make new construction
and alteration of places where employment would occur accessible to individuals with
disabilities.
82 See, e.g., Patrick; 8 NDLR & 282 (DOJ 1995) (advisory opinion). Note also that the
DOJ was the plaintiff in United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997), in which it was contended that architect defendants violated ADA Title Ill.
83 See supra cases cited in note 77.
84 See supra text accompanying note 80.
85 In Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. at 1267-69, the court ruled exactly that, and held,
contrary to the courts cited in note 77, supra, that architects can be held liable under Title III for
the failure to design accessible facilities.
86 At least one commentator has cited this reasoning as an example of the judicial




fights/nondiscrimination principles that they deem to be the ADA's primary
concern.
These three examples illustrate some of the means by which the courts have
attempted to limit the circumstances under which entities are obligated to provide
affirmative assistance for people with disabilities. 87 Clearly, many courts are
uncomfortable with the notion that certain segments of society, or even society-
at-large in the form of benefits provided by state and local government entities,
must bear the responsibility for affirmatively assisting people with disabilities to
take part in mainstream society. These courts either do not understand, or do not
accept, the concept of reasonable accommodations as part and parcel of the
nondiscrimination principle. They appear to view the provision of reasonable
accommodations as an "extra" requirement that goes beyond simple
nondiscrimination precepts, have chosen to focus on the traditional civil-
rights/basic nondiscrimination mandate expressed in the ADA, and ignore the
arguably conflicting affirmative action mandate. In this manner, individuals with
disabilities are shepherded through a revolving door. They are permitted entry
halfway into the mainstream via traditional equality principles, but are quickly
ushered back to their isolated starting point by being denied the reasonable
accommodations necessary to provide meaningful civil rights or accessibility.
B. Following the "Race Neutral" Concept of Civil Rights Laws
A second reason that the civil rights model may have served to hamper
achievement of the ADA's objectives is that the "race neutral" concept of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is inapplicable to most cases involving different
treatment of individuals with disabilities.
Discrimination on the basis of race and "discrimination" on the basis of
disability are two different animals, which bear only a passing resemblance to
one another.88 The principles underlying the two forms of different treatment are
very different, and thus the means of eradicating those forms of different
treatment must necessarily be very different. The core of the Civil Rights Act is
87 These examples are just a drop in the bucket. Unfortunately, it is not possible in this
brief article to provide an overview of the multitude of other situations in which courts have
narrowed the scope of the ADA.
88 Indeed, some people of color have told this author that they are insulted by efforts to
categorize discrimination on the .basis of race and discrimination on the basis of disability as
similar societal problems to be resolved in a similar manner. As one Black individual told me,
I, as a deaf person, lack one of the five basic senses; she, as a Black person, does not. I have a
physical disability that inherently limits my ability to function in some situations. She, to the
converse, is not inherently limited in her ability to function in any situation. To say that we face
similar societal problems because she is Black implies that her race constitutes some sort of
deficiency.
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the "race neutral" principle, pursuant to which an individual's race is irrelevant
and must be ignored when making employment decisions affecting that
individual (or when making decisions affecting that individual's ability to
participate in other aspects of mainstream society). An analogous "disability
neutral" principle does not, and cannot, apply in most cases arising under the
ADA. Many courts, however, are unable to disregard the neutrality precept when
deciding ADA cases, because the ADA is premised on the Civil Rights Act-
which is, in turn, premised on the neutrality precept.
1. Intentional Discrimination
When the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1964, discrimination on the basis
of race was viewed as being largely premised on a hostile animus-as being
generally intentional. 89 The focus of the Act was on actions taken due to bias or
hostility, such as those presented in the following examples: a restaurant or
theater owner who refused to admit Blacks did so intentionally due to feelings of
hostility or bias toward people who are Black an employer who refused to hire
Blacks did so intentionally due to feelings of hostility or bias toward people who
are Black; states requiring Black children to attend separate schools did so
intentionally due to feelings of hostility or bias toward people who are Black.
The Civil Rights Act recognized that the color of a person's skin does not create
any meaningful distinctions between that person's capabilities and the
capabilities of other persons. The Black person's skin color, in and of itself, does
not make him or her less capable of eating in a restaurant, watching a theater
presentation, attending school, or performing a job. There are no inherent
differences based on race that lead, unintentionally, to different treatment of
people of different races. Such distinctions are generally created irrationally, by
people or entities engaging in intentional discrimination-largely in the form of
deliberate segregation-based on bias or prejudice against people of color. The
Civil Rights Act was geared primarily toward prohibiting, and eradicating, this
type of irrational, intentional discrimination.
Some discrimination against people with disabilities has also been, and
continues to be, intentional--premised on irrational bias or stereotypes.
Numerous examples of such intentional discrimination were discussed during the
legislative hearings prior to enactment of the ADA. One person with a disability
recounted a situation in which people attempted to remove her and her friend
with a disability from an auction house because they were "disgusting to look
at."90 Another person with a disability recounted a 1988 incident in which the
89 See generally WHALEN, supra note 23 (noting that the Civil Rights Act was enacted
primarily to eradicate the intentional segregation of Blacks).
90 S. REP. No. 101-116 at 7 (1989) (testimony by Judith Heumann, World Institute on
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owner of a movie theater prohibited her from entering his theater and argued,
"I... don't have to let her in here, and I don't want her in here." 91 These types of
discriminatory action are analogous to the types of intentional discriminatory
action the Civil Rights Act focused on at the time of its enactment. To the extent
that the ADA intends to prohibit and eradicate such intentionally discriminatory
conduct, the statutory model patterned after the Civil Rights Act is appropriate
and applicable.
2. Disparate Impact Discrimination
In some respects, the congressional hearings leading to enactment of the
ADA focused too extensively on the intentional discrimination faced by people
with disabilities-particularly the intentional segregation of people with
disabilities.92 While people with disabilities havehistorically been subjected to
intentional discrimination, it is well recognized that most different treatment of
people with disabilities is not based on intentional discrimination, premised on
irrational bias or hostility. The Supreme Court noted in Alexander v. Choate93
that Congress has recognized that different treatment of people with disabilities is
'most often the product not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness
and indifference-of benign neglect,"94 and that "[flederal agencies and
commentators on the plight of the handicapped... have found that
discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic
attitudes rather than affirmative animus." 95
The more frequent scenario concerning different treatment of people with
disabilities involves not the deliberate, affirmative exclusion from programs or
activities, but the passive failure to provide affirmative assistance to make
inclusion possible. For example, no theater owner has told me that I may not
enter his theater, but all theater owners have passively refrained from making the
movies in their theaters accessible to me-through either open or closed
captioning. It is not the theater owners' intentional, affirmative act premised on
hostility or bias, that has resulted in my being unable to watch the movies shown
at their theaters. (In fact I suspect that theater owners would be pleased if I was
able to watch the movies shown at their theaters, for I might then become a
Disability).
9 1ADA: Hearings, supra note 25, at. 64-65 (testimony of Lisa Carl).
92 See Cook, supra note 40 (focusing on the need for the ADA to eradicate the historical
intentional segregation of people with disabilities). The legislative history of the ADA also
discusses numerous examples of intentional discrimination. See supra notes 90-91.
93 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
94 Id. at 295.
95 Id at 296.
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paying customer.) Rather, it is the theater owners' passive failure to affirmatively
spend money or incur other burdens to provide captioned movies to make the
theater accessible to me that immortalizes the existing "differentness" of my
status. To the extent that this passivity constitutes discrimination, it is defined as
disparate impact discrimination rather than intentional discrimination.
Of course, disparate impact discrimination on the basis of race is also
prevalent. Thus, since 1971 courts have interpreted the Civil Rights Act as
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination as well as intentional
discrimination,96 and in 1991 (one year after the ADA's enactment), the Civil
Rights Act's proscription against disparate impact discrimination was codified in
the Civil Rights Restoration Act.97 For several reasons, however, the Civil Rights
Act's prohibition of both intentional and disparate impact forms of
discrimination does not constitute an appropriate model upon which to base the
ADA's proscription against disability based discrimination.
We have already seen that most discrimination against people with
disabilities constitutes disparate impact discrimination. Unlike the color of a
person's skin, a disability itself often constitutes an inherent physical or mental
difference that, in the absence of affirmative assistance or accommodation,
results in the different treatment that the ADA terms discriminatory. In most
cases it is the simple maintenance of the status quo that constitutes the prohibited
different or discriminatory treatment. When the Civil Rights Act was enacted in
1964, however, discrimination on the basis of race was viewed as being primarily
intentional in that individual action or design was seen to create the differentness
or discrimination (i.e. the segregation); the illegal conduct under the Civil Rights
Act was viewed as the "active" differential treatment based on race. In the more
prevalent disability setting, to the converse, individual action or design resolves
inherent differentness or discrimination; thus the illegal conduct prescribed by
the ADA is the passive failure to make necessary (reasonable) accommodations
to eliminate that inherent differentness or discrimination.
The fact that the most prevalent form of discrimination on the basis of
disability constitutes disparate impact discrimination, whereas the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted primarily for the purpose of preventing intentional
discrimination, renders the Civil Rights Act model inherently troublesome for
cases arising under the ADA. To prevent the principal form of discrimination on
the basis of race at issue when the Civil Rights Act was enacted-that based on
96 The courts have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting disparate impact
discrimination at least since the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424(1971).
9 7 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 (codified 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (1994)). Section 105 of that Act provides a definition of disparate impact
discrimination.
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irrational bias or hostility-that Act requires individuals or entities to follow a
"race neutral" approach. Congress theorized that because an individual's race is
irrelevant when considering that individual's capabilities, race must play no
factor in any decision made by entities covered under the Civil Rights Act. To
prevent the more prevalent form of discrimination on the basis of disability,
however, individuals or entities cannot follow a "disability neutral" approach. To
ignore the disability is to implement the status quo, which reinforces and
prolongs the inherent differentness caused by the disability and constitutes
impermissible discrimination under the ADA. This fundamental difference
between the premises upon which the Civil Rights Act and the ADA were based
renders the former an inappropriate statutory model for the latter.98
In addition, neither Congress nor the courts have favored the disparate
impact discrimination claims of members of minority races (or those of women),
and that general disfavor has become much more prominent in recent years.99 It
took twenty-seven years for Congress to enact the Civil Rights Restoration Act
codifying the disparate impact theory of discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act. And the courts are proving even more reluctant to enforce the prohibition of
98 One early commentator, discussing the problems inherent in premising section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act on civil ights laws protecting racial minorities and women, noted that
the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination serves two primary purposes: (1) it serves as
a means of ferreting out subtle forms of discrimination, pursuant to which intentional
discrimination is masked by facially neutral policies; and (2) it serves as a means of taking steps
"to ensure that the vestiges of past [intentional] discrimination, as reflected in disparate impact
statistics, are totally eliminated." Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights
of the Disabled, 74 GEo. L.J. 1435, 1450-51 (1986). Professor Rebell argued that these
principles did not generally apply in the context of discrimination against people with
disabilities, because:
In the handicapped context, ... where invidious animus often is not the predominant cause of
discrimination, a legal standard geared toward ferreting out subtle forms of discriminatory
intent, or making whole the victims of past invidious animus, will not, ipso facto, be dealing
with the fundamental issues. Here, a showing of disparate impact cannot automatically justify
remedial action because it cannot be presumed to reflect any underlying past or present
discriminatory intent, even when not adequately explained. Without some intentionally
discriminatory acts to provide a basis for ultimate liability, some further justification is required
to establish why an "innocent" defendant should be put to the trouble or expense of changing
practices which "happen" to cause difficult[y] for the handicapped.
Id. at 1451.
99 For a good discussion of this point, see Diller, supra note 6. See also, Ruth Colker,
Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent Heterosexual White Men: The
Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 195 (1995) (explaining that the courts have been more receptive to the Title VII
claims made by white males than to the Title VII claims made by women or members of racial
minorities).
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disparate impact discrimination against individuals with disabilities.100 Indeed,
recent data analyzing both Title VII and ADA Title I cases between January 1
and July 1, 1999, evidences that Civil Rights Act Title VII plaintiffs fared much
better in the courts than did ADA plaintiffs.101
Race-based disparate impact discrimination differs significantly from
disability-based disparate impact discrimination, in that disparate impact
discrimination on the basis of disability often involves a covered entity's refusal
to spend money, incur administrative or other burdens, or simply to treat a person
with a disability in some "special" manner that may not be burdensome-to
provide accommodations for an individual with a disability. On the other hand,
cost, the incurrence of burdens, or the provision of "special treatment" are
usually not issues in race-based disparate impact discrimination, although they
usually are issues in disability-based disparate impact discrimination. It is not
surprising, therefore, that there is even greater judicial reluctance to recognize
disparate impact discrimination in the disability context than in the race context.
The reluctance of courts to accept disparate impact theories of discrimination in
general, and the more specific reluctance of courts to accept cost- or burden-
based disparate impact theories of discrimination in the disability context, does
not bode well for future judicial implementation of the ADA.
Compare, for example, two possible disparate impact discrimination
claims--one arising under the ADA and the other arising under the Civil Rights
Act. Suppose I file an action under the ADA claiming that the providers of
telephone communication systems are discriminating against people who are
deaf. I do not claim intentional discrimination, for no provider of telephone
services has intentionally prohibited me from using the telephone. However, the
telephone system was designed to operate via voice and hearing. That design has
a disparate impact on those of us who are deaf-we have been unintentionally
excluded from participating in society's telephone communication system. My
claim is analogous to a discrimination claim asserted by African Americans
under the Civil Rights Act, that standardized educational tests have a disparate
impact on African Americans, who have faced social and economic
disadvantages not faced by members of other races, which has resulted in the
unintentional exclusion of African Americans from our system of higher
education.
In this age of judicial hostility toward civil rights claims and affirmative
action,' 02 the courts are not likely to be receptive to either my claim on behalf of
100 See supra articles cited in note 6.
101 See Colker, Winning, supra note 6.
102 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6; Linda Hamilton Kreiger, Backlash against the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social
Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
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people who are deaf or the claim made on behalf of African Americans.
However, I suspect that the courts would be even less supportive of my claim,
because: (1) the number of deaf people in the United States is presumably
significantly smaller than the number of African Americans, and thus fewer
people would benefit from the redesign at issue; (2) the cost of redesigning the
telephone system would arguably be significantly higher than the cost of
redesigning post-secondary admissions tests; (3) it may be technologically
infeasible, if not impossible, to redesign the telephone system; and (4) society-at-
large continues to view disabilities as "unnatural," and most people are not
accepting of the proposition that the "natural" state of society should be viewed
as that which is accessible to the most disabled among us. 103
103 This latter point is debatable. There appears to be great societal resistance to
modifying the "merit principle" by changing testing instruments or procedures to accommodate
people of minority races. That resistance may be as great as societal resistance toward making
expensive global changes to make all of society accessible to all people with disabilities.
A word of explanation is required with respect to the proposition that the natural state of
society should be viewed as that which is accessible to the most disabled among us. Advocates
for people with disability have long argued that disability is but one form of the "human
constant." Jessica Scheer & Nora Groce, Impairment as a Human Constant: Cross-Cultural
and Historical Perspectives on Variation, 44 . SOC. ISSUES 23 (1988). See generally ROBERT
M. VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE: WHY THE RETARDED AND THE REST OF US
DESERVE EQUALITY (1986); ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN AND MARY B. MAHOWALD,
DiSABILIy, DIFFERENCE, DIscRIMImATION (1998). In accord with this reasoning, it is argued
that the "normal" state of society should be viewed as one that is accessible to all people in all
circumstances. Following this principle, all buses, trains, and other modes of transportation
should be fully accessible to all people who are mobility impaired; in every place where a voice
telephone is available, a TDD should also be available for people who are deaf; every book and
every visual sign should also be written in Braille or accompanied by audio script-regardless
of the number of people (if any) who would benefit from such full accessibility. Such a
scenario should be viewed as the norm, and instances in which society is not fully accessible
should be viewed as abnormal. See, e.g., Asch Letter, supra note 35. See also Burgdorf, supra
note 6 at 515-24. Professor Burgdorf relies in part on the U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILIaEs (1983), in arguing that we should
not look to one state of being as "normal" and another state of being as "abnormal," but that we
should view all states of being as normal, with different people falling along different places of
the very broad spectrum of normality.
While I cannot help but appreciate this utopian concept in theory (what I wouldn't give to
be able to use the phone at any time in any place!), I do not see society-at-large, including the
courts, as coming to accept this precept for many generations to come-if ever. The view that
many disabilities are "unnatural" conditions is hardly unreasonable; after all, can it really be
said that it is "natural" to lack the ability to hear, to see, or to walk? Thus, while most people-
including the courts-will hopefully come to accept the principle of providing reasonable
accommodations for people with "unnatural" conditions, I question whether they will come to
accept the unnatural as natural and willingly agree to reverse the norms of society.
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In sum, people with disabilities are severely disadvantaged by the fact that
the ADA is premised on the antidiscrimination model of the Civil Rights Act,
because: (1) the Civil Rights Act was designed primarily to eradicate intentional
discrimination; (2) most cases involving discrimination on the basis of disability
involve disparate impact discrimination rather than intentional discrimination
based on bias and hostility, and thus the "race-neutral" concept of the Civil
Rights Act is inapplicable to most ADA cases; (3) although the Civil Rights Act
has been utilized and expanded to cover disparate impact discrimination, race-
based disparate impact discrimination generally takes a different form than
disability-based disparate impact discrimination; and (4) the courts tend to
disfavor disparate impact discrimination claims in general, and are beginning to
show even less support for the cost-based disparate impact discrimination claims
of people with disabilities.
Two striking examples of the manner in which the Civil Rights Act
"neutrality" model has had an adverse impact on the ADA discrimination claims
of individuals with disabilities are seen in: (a) cases discussing the issues of
whether, and when, damages may be awarded to the plaintiff who proves he or
she has been discriminated against in violation of ADA Title II, and (b) cases
discussing the responsibilities of insurers under ADA Title III. Again, these cases
illustrate the manner in which the courts shepherd individuals with disabilities
through a revolving door. Individuals with disabilities are theoretically permitted
basic access to the mainstrean, but, due to application of the "disability neutral"
principle, they are immediately herded back to their isolated starting point.
(a) Damages for Violations of ADA Title H
Title II of the ADA prohibits state and local government entities from
discriminating on the basis of disability.' 0 4 To fulfill this nondiscrimination
mandate, state and local government entities must ensure that all of their
programs, services, and facilities, when viewed in their entirety, are accessible to
people with disabilities.105 Thus, state and local government entities must make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to accommodate
the needs of people with disabilities. 10 6
ADA Title II incorporates the remedies provisions of section 505 of the
Rehabilitation Act,'0 7 which, in tum, incorporates the remedies provisions of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.108 The remedies available to plaintiffs who have
10442 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12133 (1994).
105 See generally ThCKER & GOLDsTEIN, supra note 4, at ch. 25.
106 Id.
107 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994).
108 As previously noted, see supra notes 19 & 20, Title VI prohibits recipients of federal
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been discriminated against on the basis of disability by state or local government
entities, therefore, are to mirror the remedies available to plaintiffs who have
been discriminated against on the basis of race or disability by recipients of
federal financial assistance.
The Supreme Court has ruled that only plaintiffs who have been
intentionally discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act may recover compensatory damages.10 9 In order to recover
such damages, a plaintiff who has been discriminated against on the basis of race
must prove that the defendant acted with "discriminatory animus."' o10 Following
the precept that the same principles applicable to cases arising under Title VI
must also be applied to cases arising under ADA Title II, courts have held that
intentional discrimination, in the form of discriminatory animus or deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff's rights that is aldn to discriminatory animus, is a
prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages to a plaintiff who has been
discriminated against in violation of ADA Title 11.111
The obvious problem is that most cases in which a state or local government
entity is held to have violated ADA Title II involve disparate impact
discrimination, rather than intentional discrimination.1 12 Thus, application of the
Civil Rights Act Title VI rule requiring a showing of intentional discrimination
as a prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages to ADA Title I cases
ultimately results in compensatory damages being unavailable under Title II.
Such an incongruous result contravenes the very precepts upon which ADA Title
I was based; it leaves people with disabilities with no remedies, or less than
financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, while section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, to which the remedies set forth in section 505 apply, prohibits recipients of
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of disability. The remedies
provision of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that remedies for violations of the Act
include the termination of, or refusal to grant, federal funding to the entity in violation of the
Act, or any other remedies authorized by law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
109 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
10 Id. at 584.
II1 See Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
112Not all discriminatory conduct under ADA Title II constitutes intentional
discrimination, however. The purposeful segregation of people with disabilities by state or local
government entities is more appropriately labeled intentional, rather than disparate impact,
discrimination. See Susan Stefan, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law:
Issues for the Twenty-First Century, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUEs 131 (1999). Professor
Stefan observes that the ADA's integration mandate differs from the reasonable
accommodation mandate, in that the former does not require the affirmative provision of new
services, but is a prerequisite to the provision of the latter, for people with disabilities must be
permitted to integrate into mainstream society before they may be provided with reasonable
accommodations. Professor Stephan appropriately characterizes the segregation of people with
disabilities, by means such as institutionalization, as intentional discrimination.
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adequate remedies, for violations of Title LI, and provides an incentive to state
and local government entities to perpetuate discrimination against people with
disabilities.113 The case of Ferguson v. City of Phoenix14 serves to illustrate
these points.
The plaintiffs in Ferguson were several deaf individuals who had made at
least twenty-four unsuccessful attempts, during different emergencies occurring
over a period of approximately seventeen months, to reach the City of Phoenix's
9-1-1 system. The City's 9-1-1 services were simply not accessible to people who
used TDDs, for a variety of reasons. The City initially had only one TDD for use
by its more than thirty stations having 9-1-1 operators; at some point that number
was increased to two TDDs. An individual who called 9-1-1 via TDD was
required to hit the space bar on his or her TDD, which in theory was supposed to
cause emission of a tone that would allow the responding operator to know that a
TDD caller was on the line, which would, in turn, cause the responding operator
to transfer the call to the one (and later two) operator station(s) having a TDD.
This system did not work, for several reasons. First, TDD users do not usually hit
the space bar after TDD calls they have placed are answered, so most TDD users
were not aware of the requirement that they must follow such a procedure in a 9-
1-1 emergency situation. Second, hitting the space bar at that point in the
telephone call causes many TDDs to disconnect the line. Third, even when TDD
callers did hit the space bar on their TDDs, and even when their TDDs did not
disconnect as a result, the 9-1-1 operators usually did not respond to the TDD
calls. The 9-1-1 operators had not been trained to recognize the tone sometimes
emitted when the space bar was pressed, and thus, the operators treated all calls
in which no person responded to the operator's introduction as "haang-up" calls.
Furthermore, even if the 9-1-1 operator did recognize the TDD tone, the call
often could not be responded to by the operator at the one (or two) operator
station(s) having a TDD because the operator to whom the call was transferred
was on the voice phone, and thus, the phone line at his or her station was busy.
Plaintiffs and others complained to the city repeatedly during this seventeen
month period that its 9-1-1 system was not accessible to people who use TDDs.
The city was furnished with a copy of relevant portions of the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual, which states, inter
alia, that providers of 9-1-1 services are not permitted to require TDD callers to
comply with additional dialing or space bar requirements. 115 Nevertheless, the
city did not eliminate its space-bar requirement, obtain additional TDDs, or
otherwise make its 9-1-1 system accessible to deaf callers until after (1) plaintiffs
filed three separate lawsuits under ADA Title II (which were subsequently
113 See infra text accompanying notes 124-134.
114 931 F. Supp. 688 (D. Ariz. 1996), afid, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
115 DOJ, MANuAL, supra note 55, at § 11-7.3100.
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consolidated), (2) the parties engaged in months of discovery and made and
defended numerous judicial motions, and, (3) ultimately, a consent order was
entered, which required specifying in detail the manner in which the city must
make its 9-1-1 system accessible to people who use TDDs.
The district court held that the city had violated ADA Title II by failing to
make its 9-1-1 system accessible to people who are deaf.116 The court found that
the DOJ's position with respect to the space bar was "reasonable," due to the
necessity of removing discrimination against 9-1-1 callers who are deaf, and held
that the fact that the city disagreed with the DOJ's rules was irrelevant.
Following principles developed under the Civil Rights Act, however, the district
court held that compensatory damages were only available under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and ADA Title II if the City's discriminatory conduct was
intentional. The court did not follow the test for intentional discrimination set
forth by the Supreme Court in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commission,117 but borrowed the test for intentional discrimination followed in
§ 1983 cases.118 Applying that test, the court held that the City's conduct could
be held to be intentional if only the City acted "with at least deliberate
indifference to the strong likelihood that a violation of federally protected rights"
would result from its actions. 119 With respect to the City's deliberate refusal to
adhere to the DOJ's "no space-bar" rule, the district court held that unless
plaintiffs could show that either (1) the city knew that the DOJ's Technical
Assistance Manual had the force of law or (2) the city "did not have a good faith
belief that the Manual did not have the force and effect of law, the City [could
not] be held to have acted intentionally or with deliberate indifference to
plaintiffs' rights. ' 120 The district court did not address any other evidence
introduced by plaintiffs relating to the city's conduct.
The primary issues on appeal were whether intentional discrimination is a
prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages against a defendant who has
violated ADA Title II and section 504, and, if so, what constitutes the standard
for defining the requisite intent. The majority of the Ninth Circuit relied on
Guardians when ruling that intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to an
award of compensatory damages under ADA Title II and section 504.121 The
Ninth Circuit declined to decide what standard of intent should be applied in
section 504 and ADA Title II cases, but held that plaintiffs could not show that
the city acted with intentional discrimination under either the "discriminatory
116 Ferguson, 931 F. Supp. 688 (D. Ariz. 1996).
117 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
118 See42 U.S.C. § 1983.
119 Ferguson, 931 F. Supp. at 697.
120 Id
121 Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
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animus" test set forth in Guardians or the "deliberate indifference" test applied
by the district court.122
The Ninth Circuit simply applied by rote the judicially crafted rule relating
to awards of damages under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to cases arising
under ADA Title 111.123 This reasoning ignores several important principles.
First, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning contravenes the remedial scheme devised
by Congress. Congress expressly overruled states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit under ADA Title H1 and specifically provided that states are
subject to remedies at both law and equity for violations of ADA Title 11.124 The
Supreme Court has held that unless Congress clearly limits the remedies
available under a federal statute, the full panoply of remedies must be available
under that statute. 125 When enacting the ADA, Congress expressly chose to limit
the remedies available in some titles of the Act, but not to limit the remedies
available under other titles. Thus, Congress limited the remedies available to
private parties who are discriminated against in violation of ADA Title Im to
preventative relief,126 but placed no limitations at all on the remedies available to
private plaintiffs who are discriminated against in violation of ADA Title II.
Initially Congress also limited the remedies available to plaintiffs discriminated
against in violation of ADA Title I to equitable remedies, 127 but again chose not
to place similar limitations on the remedies available under Title II.
Subsequently, when enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made
damages available under ADA Title I, but limited the availability of such
damages to cases involving intentional discrimination, prohibited an award of
damages in cases in which the employer demonstrates good faith efforts to
comply with the Act, and capped the amount of damages that can be awarded
based on the defendant employer's size. 128 Again, Congress chose not to extend
those limitations to cases arising under ADA Title 1I.
In unthinkingly and rigidly applying the reasoning of judicial decisions
interpreting the Civil Rights Act to cases arising under ADA Title ]:, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the ADA's express remedial scheme and disregarded the
122 Id at 675.
123 A comprehensive article discussing the flaws in the district court's reasoning,
followed in large part by the Ninth Circuit, is Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Note, Disabling the
Relationship between Intentional Discrimination and Compensatory Damages under Title JI of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 66 G. WASH. L. REv. 592 (1998).
12428 C.F.R. § 35.178 (1999).
125 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
126 See42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1994).
127 See § 12117.
128 § 1981a.
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principle that the full panoply of remedies must be available under a federal
statute unless Congress says otherwise.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning encourages state and local government
entities to ignore the nondiscrimination mandate of ADA Title I. The Ninth
Circuit held that a public entity that exhibits the usual "lack of knowledge and
understanding" of its obligations to make its programs and facilities accessible
and engages in "common bureaucratic inertia," has not engaged in intentional
discrimination warranting an award of compensatory damages under Title 11.129
In effect, the Ninth Circuit ruled that state and local government entities are free
to simply implement the status quo, without making any modifications or
changes to their programs to make them accessible, until such time as some
person with a disability files a lawsuit and a court orders the entity to comply
with the law. Since an entity may not be held responsible for its failure to comply
with ADA Title 11 absent a showing of discriminatory intent, it behooves the
entity to sit passively and do nothing. In fact, the entity would be wise to refrain
from learning what its obligations are under the ADA, because it will not be held
responsible for violating any law of which it is unaware or which it believes, in
good faith, does not apply to its passive conduct. 130 Because there are no
penalties imposed if an entity waits to comply with the law until such time as a
plaintiff prevails in court, it is to the entity's advantage to do exactly that.
The effect of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is to encourage state and local
government entities to ignore Title l's mandate to make their programs and
facilities accessible to people with disabilities. The Ninth Circuit's ruling,
therefore, defeats the purpose for which ADA Title 11 was enacted.
Third, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning denies persons harmed by
discrimination on the basis of disability appropriate remedies, in contravention of
Congressional intent. All of the plaintiffs in Ferguson allegedly suffered
damages as a result of their inability to contact 9-1-1. The plaintiffs were never
permitted to present evidence of the damages they suffered, however, since the
court focused entirely on the city's motives in failing to make its 9-1-1 services
accessible (motives which are difficult, at best, for plaintiffs to prove). Plaintiffs'
damages were deemed irrelevant. The only remedy awarded to them was an
order that the city's 9-1-1 services be made accessible in the future. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit was so bold as to state that "equitable relief is sufficient to remedy
the problem[s]" 131 the plaintiffs suffered as a result of the city's violations of
Title %1, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had never been permitted to show what
those problems were. In requiring proof of intentional discrimination as a
prerequisite to an award of damages under ADA Title II, the Ninth Circuit has
129 Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1998).
130 See supra text at note 120.
131 Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 675.
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left persons who have been discriminated against on the basis of disability by
state or local governments without any remedy for past harms. The Ninth
Circuit's ruling contravenes Congressional intent. Congress did not provide any
indication of an intent to deny ADA Title II plaintiffs meaningful remedies for
harm caused by violations of the Act.
Fortunately, the plaintiffs in Ferguson, at least, were able to obtain the
benefit of prospective injunctive relief. Any of the plaintiffs still living132 will
hopefully be able to access the city's 9-1-1 services in the future should the need
ever arise. In many cases arising under ADA Title I, however, the plaintiffs are
not able to obtain such prospective relief. In order to have standing to obtain
injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is likely that he or she will
suffer harm due to future discriminatory actions of the defendant. 133 In many
instances courts have held that ADA plaintiffs did not satisfy that prerequisite,
and thus have ruled that the plaintiffs could not seek injunctive relief for
violations of the ADA. To cite just one example, in Aikins v. St. Helena
Hospital134a deaf woman claimed that a hospital violated ADA Title IMI by
refusing to provide her with interpreters to enable her to understand what hospital
personnel were saying to her, which had the effect of rendering the services
provided to her by the hospital ineffective. The court held that the deaf woman
lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under Title III, because there was no
evidence showing that she would require the services of that hospital in the
future. 135
There are many situations in which an individual with a disability could
suffer harm due to a state or local government entity's violation of ADA Title II,
but would be precluded from seeking injunctive relief against that entity due to
the inability to show that he or she would suffer from the entity's future
discriminatory conduct. Imagine that Joe, a resident of New York who is deaf,
takes a vacation in California. While in California he becomes ill and is admitted
13 2 One of the plaintiffs died during the pendency of the action.
133 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
134 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
13 5 1d. at 1333. See also Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., No 96-1870, 1998 U.S
Dist. LEXIS 21830 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 1998) (finding that a deaf plaintiff who was denied sign
language interpreters during, inter alia, discussions with doctors regarding the need to amputate
his lower leg, could not be awarded injunctive relief against the hospital because the plaintiff
did not show that he was likely to return to the defendant hospital in the future); Naiman v.
N.Y. Univ., No. 95 Civ. 6469, 1997 WL 249970 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1997) (denying injunctive
relief to a deaf patient who visited a hospital four times but did not show that he would require
the services of that hospital again in the future); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va.
1995) (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief requiring a dentist who
had refused to treat people with AIDS to do so in the future, because there was no evidence that
any future discriminatory conduct by that dentist would be likely to harm that plaintiff).
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to a state hospital. The hospital refuses to provide Joe with an interpreter. As a
result Joe misunderstands the doctor's words and thus mistakenly agrees to
undergo or to refrain from undergoing a medical procedure. Or suppose that Joe
visits a California state park or museum with a group of friends, and the exhibits
at the facility are primarily in audio format but the facility has refused to either
caption or provide a script of the exhibits. The bulk of the exhibits at the facility
are thus inaccessible to Joe, and he spends three hours sitting in the lobby waiting
for his friends while they enjoy the museum. While Joe has suffered harm in both
instances as a result of those entities' violations of ADA Title D, no remedy is
available to Joe in either case. He cannot seek compensatory damages, because
the discrimination at issue in both cases was not intentional but resulted from
simple bureaucratic inertia and a lack of understanding of the defendants'
responsibilities under the ADA. Also, Joe cannot seek injunctive relief because it
is unlikely that he will visit either the California state hospital or the California
state museum in the future and would thus suffer future harm as a result of those
entities' violations of ADA Title II. In such situations, plaintiffs are denied any
remedies for violations of Title II.
Congress clearly did not intend these results. Congress expressly permitted
such unfortunate results under ADA Title III by limiting the relief that people
with disabilities could obtain from private business people. To the converse,
because it believed that state and local government entities should have greater
responsibilities than private business people to make their programs and facilities
accessible to all members of society, Congress deliberately chose not to limit the
relief that people with disabilities could obtain from state and local governments,
and thus did not limit the remedies under ADA Title I. The Ninth Circuit's
ruling leads to the opposite result that Congress intended when devising the
ADA's remedial scheme.
In sum, in Ferguson v. City of Phoenix the Ninth Circuit cavalierly applied
judicial precepts developed to foster the goals of the Civil Rights Act to cases
arising under ADA Title II, without considering the different concepts on which
those two laws are premised, and without giving recognition to the significant
differences between the primary forms of discrimination prohibited by the two
Acts. Therefore the Ninth Circuit applied civil rights principles to defeat the
reasonable accommodation requirements of ADA Title ]I.136 Unfortunately, the
136 Other courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118
F.3d 1400 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's ruling that intentional discrimination
is a prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages under ADA Title If); Powers v. MJB
Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1999) (following Ferguson in holding that
intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages under laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, and further ruling that the standard for
determining such intent is the "deliberate indifference" standard applied by the district court in
Ferguson); Brown v. King County Dep't of Adult Corr., No. C97-1909W, 1998 U.S. Dist.
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LEXIS 20152 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 9, 1998) (following Ferguson in holding that intentional
discrimination is a prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages under ADA Title II, but
declining to rule at that juncture what standard must be satisfied to prove the requisite intent);
Memmer v. Main County Courts, 169 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1999) (following Ferguson in
holding that intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages
under ADA Title II); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (W.D. Ark. 1998) (same).
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), a bar applicant with a learning disability alleged that a board of state bar examiners
violated ADA Title 11 and section 504 by denying her requests that she be provided
accommodations for her disability during a state bar examination. The district court held that
the defendants had violated both Acts, and further held that intentional discrimination was a
prerequisite to an award of compensatory damages under both Acts. However, the court drew a
distinction between the standard for proving intent in a "failure to accommodate" case and the
standard for proving intent in a case in which the defendant has acted intentionally due to bias
or hostility. The court held that the "failure to accommodate" situation fell somewhere between
a disparate impact and an intentional discrimination case and that:
[T]he question of intent in accommodations cases does not require that plaintiff show that
defendants harbored an animus towards her or those disabled such as she. Rather, intentional
discrimination is shown by an intentional, or willful, violation of the Act itself. With this
understood, it becomes clear, that while defendants may have had the best of intentions, and
while they may have believed themselves to be within the confines of the law, they nevertheless
intentionally violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by willfully withholding from
plaintiff the reasonable accommodations to which she was entitled under the law.
Id. at 1151. On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to accept the district court's "willfulness"
standard for proving the requisite intent, but followed Ferguson in applying the "deliberate
indifference" standard ofproof. Bartlett, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit held,
however, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory damages because she had
shown that the defendants acted with the requisite deliberate indifference. Id. The Supreme
Court vacated the case for consideration of whether Bartlett was a disabled individual within
the meaning of the ADA in accord with the Court's rulings in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (see
supra note 52).
In Tyler, 118 F.3d 1400, a dissenting judge persuasively argued that there was no evidence
that Congress intended to limit the recovery of damages under ADA Title II to cases involving
intentional discrimination and, thus, that the court should follow the rule of Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), which mandates availability of the full
panoply of remedies in the absence of congressional intent to the contrary. 118 F.3d at 1405-16
(Jenkins, J. dissenting). To date, however, the courts have generally declined to follow this
reasoning. Cf. Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding, without much
discussion, that the full panoply of remedies is available under ADA Title 11, and noting in
footnote 9 that some courts have limited damages to cases of intentional discrimination but
declining to address that issue since the plaintiff in that case had alleged intentional
discrimination); Hemandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 133-34 (D. Conn. 1997)
(stating the general rule that compensatory damages are available under the ADA but not
addressing the issue of intentional versus disparate impact discrimination).
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ADA permits such a result, because it waffles between promoting civil rights
principles and reasonable accommodation principles. 137
(b) Obligations ofInsurers under ADA Title Iff
As previously noted,138 ADA Title II prohibits all public accommodations
from discriminating on the basis of disability. Title M specifically provides that
public accommodations must allow people with disabilities to participate in an
equal fashion or to benefit equally from the goods, services, facilities,
advantages, or accommodations provided by the entity.139
To fall within the definition of a public accommodation under Title , an
entity must fit within one of twelve specific categories.140 One of those
categories includes entities such as "a laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barber
shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station,
office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office
of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment." 141 Another
section of the ADA, commonly referred to as section 501(c), provides, however,
that insurers are not prohibited from (1) "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law;" (2)
"establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide
benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law"; or
(3) "establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide
benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance"; as long as
such conduct is not "used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADA,
including Title [q."142
137 Indeed, the remedial scheme of ADA Title II may itself be viewed as waffling
between the two principles. On the one hand, Title 1 provides that the remedies under that Title
are to be the same as the remedies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. On the other hand,
Title II requires covered entities to take affirmative steps to make their programs and activities
accessible to people with disabilities. Applying all of the rules relating to the remedies available
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to ADA Title I1, however, such as the rule that
compensatory damages maybe awarded only for intentional discrimination, has the anomalous
effect of permitting-even encouraging-state and local govemments to disregard the
reasonable-accommodation requirements of Title I.
138 See supra text at note 78.
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (1994).
140 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
141 § 12181(F) (emphasis added).
142 § 12201(c) (found in ADA Title V). This clause was initially section 501(c) of the
ADA, before the Act was codified in the U.S.C., and thus came to be referred to as "section
501(c)."
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Thus, ADA Title III specifically defines the offices of insurance companies
as public accommodations, and ADA section 501(c) specifically provides that
insurance companies are prohibited from writing or implementing insurance
plans that are used as a subterfuge to avoid the nondiscrimination mandate of
Title III. Despite those statutory provisions, numerous courts have held that
insurers are not prohibited under Title m or section 501(c) from writing
insurance plans that discriminate on the basis of disability, primarily for the
reason that Title IEI only requires that the physical premises of insurance
companies be accessible to persons with disabilities, but does not require that the
practices or policies of such insurance companies be nondiscriminatory, or in
other words, does not require that people with disabilities be permitted to benefit
equally from the goods or services provided by such insurance companies. 143 A
few courts have held that Title III prohibits both the denial of access to the
physical structure of an insurance company and the refusal of an insurance
company to sell an insurance policy to a person with a disability, but does not
cover the terms and conditions set forth in such insurance policies.144
143 See, e.g., Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that
Title M covers discrimination only in the physical offices of an insurance company, but does
not cover discrimination in the terms of the insurer's policies); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (similar); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., No. 98-10585, 2000 WL
217500 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000) (similar); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Title Ill relates only to the availability of goods and
services and not to their content); Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1998) (rejecting plaintiff s ADA Title III claim because plaintiff did not allege denial of access
to a physical place); Fennell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding
that Title III does not govern with respect to commercial goods and services); Erwin v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding that a public
accommodation under Title III encompasses only the physical premises of an entity); Pappas v.
Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that Title III does not apply
to the sale of insurance contracts because the scope of Title II is limited to the ability of an
individual with a disability to use a place of public accommodation).
This reasoning-that Title III applies only to the physical premises of a public
accommodation-has been applied in cases involving entities other than insurance companies.
See, e.g., Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a football league was not a public accommodation under Title III because Title M applies
only to physical structures); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F.
Supp. 496 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that organizers of cross countrybicycle tour were not public
accommodations under Title Ill because they were not actual physical places); Elitt v. USA
Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that youth hockey club and sponsoring
organization were not public accommodations under Title Il because Title I only applies to
physical structures).
144See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title
i's nondiscrimination means only that an insurance company cannot refuse to permit people
with disabilities to enter its facility and cannot refuse to sell insurance policies to people with
disabilities). See also Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
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In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Association of New England, Inc.,145 the First Circuit clearly explained the
fallacy behind the reasoning that Title II is limited to the prohibition of
discrimination in actual structures. The First Circuit stated, inter alia:
By including "travel services" among the list of services considered "public
accommodations," Congress clearly contemplated that "service establishments"
include providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an
actual physical structure. Many travel services conduct business by telephone or
correspondence without requiring their customers to enter an office in order to obtain
their services .... It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office
to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same
services over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such
an absurd result.14 6
The First Circuit noted that its interpretation is "consistent with the
legislative history of the ADA," 147 and concluded:
Neither Title Im nor its implementing regulations make any mention of physical
boundaries or physical entry.... [To] limit the application of Title Ill to physical
structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of
the purposes of the ADA and would severely frustrate Congress's intent that
individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages,
available indiscriminately to other members of the general public. 14 8
(holding that Title III applies to the sale of insurance policies); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
950 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.H. 1996) (similar); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp.
1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that Title II governed a claim involving the denial of
insurance, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff did not allege denial of access to a physical
facility). Cf Micek v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-6757, 1999 WL 966970 (N.D. 111. Sept. 30,
1999) (applying the reasoning of Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. to state insurance
carriers under ADA Title II).
145 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
146 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (footnotes omitted).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 20. Other courts have agreed with the reasoning of the First Circuit in Carparts.
See, e.g., Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that Title III
regulates the underwriting practices of insurers); Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp.2d I
(D.D.C. 1999) (finding that Title Im[ prohibits the denial of insurance policies for individuals
with disabilities that are equal to or comparable to those offered to nondisabled individuals);
Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp.2d 211 (D.N.H. 1999) (finding that Title
III prohibits discrimination in the content of insurance policies); Connors v. Me. Med. Ctr., 70
F. Supp. 2d 40 (D. Me. 1999) (finding that Title IH applies to the substance or content of
insurance policies); Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998)
(similar); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Calif. 1998)
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The fallacy behind the reasoning that Title III precludes an insurer from
selling an insurance policy to a person with a disability, but does not preclude an
insurer from writing or implementing policies that, either by intent or by design,
discriminate on the basis of disability,149 is equally obvious. That reasoning
ignores the language of ADA section 501(c), 150 and it permits insurance
(holding that "Title lII... applies to insurance underwriting practices"); Lewis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that Title Ill prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in the provision of insurance, regardless of whether insurance policies are
purchased at an insurer's office or elsewhere); World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding that the scope of Title I extends beyond mere access to physical
premises); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 6 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA) 135 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (holding that Title IM governed with respect to an insurer that only contacted prospective
clients via mail or telephone).
The DOJ has consistently held that Title I governs with respect to the content of
insurance policies. Thus, for example, the DOJ's ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual
provides that:
[A] public accommodation may offer [an insurance] plan that limits certain kinds of coverage
based on classification of risk, but may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a different
rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the
refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to
actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
DOJ, MANUAL, supra note 55, at § 11-3.11000 (emphasis added).
14942 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). In Doe v. Mut. of Omaha, for example, Mutual of
Omaha "stipulated that it 'has not shown and cannot show that [the allegedly discriminatory
provisions in its insurance policy] are or ever have been consistent with sound actuarial
principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, bona fide risk classification, or state
law' as permitted by section 501(c). 179 F.3d at 558. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held
that Title I does not govern with respect to the content of goods and services provided, and
thus to the content of insurance policies. Because of this decision, Mutual of Omaha could not
be challenged if, in contravention of section 501(c), it had indeed used the terms of its
insurance policy as a subterfuge to avoid the principles of the ADA.
One reason given by the majority in this case for refusing to apply the principles of section
501(c) was that if the ADA applies to the contents of insurance policies, insurers would have to
defend the terms of their policies by reference to section 501(c), which would require the
federal courts to regulate the insurance industry in violation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (which "forbids construing a federal statute to 'impair or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance'). 179 F.3d at 563. The dissenting judge in this
case, however, noted that (1) it was not necessary for the court to decide whether the policy
complied with section 501(c) due to the insurance company's stipulation that the provisions at
issue did not fall within section 501(c)'s safe harborprovisions and (2) the McCarran-Ferguson
Act does not preclude the court from determining "whether an insurer may refuse to deal with
disabled persons on the same terms as nondisabled persons." Id. at 566.
150 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
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companies to provide goods and services that individuals with disabilities may
not enjoy to the same extent as those goods and services may be enjoyed by
individuals without disabilities. In short, like the reasoning that Title ll's
nondiscrimination mandate applies only to physical premises of a public
accommodation, this reasoning flies in the face of ADA Title III's express intent.
Courts applying these two forms of reasoning to defeat the purposes of ADA
Title III have again applied the "neutrality" precept of the Civil Rights Act to
defeat the reasonable accommodation requirements of the ADA. Following Civil
Rights Act premises, those courts have chosen to view the ADA as requiring
equal treatment of persons with disabilities and have chosen to disregard the
affirmative conduct requirements of the Act. Under civil rights principles it is
sufficient that people with disabilities have equal access to insurance offices and,
once inside those offices, have equal right to purchase insurance policies having
the same contents as policies purchased by nondisabled persons. Changing the
terms or contents of the insurance policies so that people with disabilities receive
coverage equal to that provided to nondisabled people, however, requires
affirmative action that goes beyond basic civil rights premises. These courts are
not willing to read the ADA in such an expansive manner,151 and the ADA
permits such a result by appearing to waffle between traditional civil rights and
affirmative action precepts.
111. THE ADA's PosrTIvE EFFECTS, AND CAUTIONARY WORDS
FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the flaws inherent in the ADA, the current situation is not totally
bleak. There is some room for optimism. Notwithstanding its drawbacks, the
ADA has helped in many respects to integrate people with disabilities into
mainstream society. From a personal perspective, I can see significant changes.
Prior to the ADA's enactment, for example, no hotels or motels had TDDs or
closed captioned television sets for the use of their customers. Although I am
fiustrated by the fact that, ten years after the ADA Title III requirement that all
hotels and motels have that equipment available, many (maybe most) hotels and
motels have still not complied with the law, I am well aware that during that
151 Indeed, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha dissenting Judge Terence T. Evans tried to lessen
the impact of the affirmative conduct required by analogizing that, in being asked to require an
insurance company to provide nondiscriminatory coverage to people with disabilities,
we are not being asked to force a restaurant to alter its menu to accommodate disabled diners;
we are being asked to stop a restaurant that is offering to its nondisabled diners a menu
containing a variety of entrees while offering a menu with only limited selections to its disabled
patrons.
179 F.3d at 565. The majority obviously was not persuaded by that reasoning
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period more and more hotels and motels have acquired both TDDs and closed
captioned TVs. This is progress.
Similarly, since enactment of the ADA more and more entities have acquired
TDDs for their own use, thus enabling me to communicate with those entities
directly on the telephone. While I am frustrated by the fact that all entities
required by the ADA to acquire TDDs and implement TDD lines have not yet
done so, and that some entities that have acquired TDDs and installed TDD lines
do not answer their TDD numbers (making TDDs virtually useless), the fact
remains that progress has been made. I can now directly call many entities on
TDD that I could not call ten years ago. Moreover, relay services, not generally
available ten years ago, are now available nationwide. This is progress.
In addition, some public accommodations and state and local government
entities have voluntarily complied with the ADA and have willingly made their
programs and activities accessible to me-for example, the university theater that
provided me with an oral interpreter so I could attend and understand a play.152
While I am fiustrated that not all public accommodations and state and local
governments have complied with the law, again the fact is that progress has been
made. I, for one, am grateful for that progress.
The drafters of the ADA recognized at the onset that the Act would not, in
and of itself, serve to fully integrate people with disabilities into mainstream
society. The ADA was expected to serve as the starting point or impetus to foster
a change in societal attitudes toward people with disabilities. Unfortunately,
progress is slower than many people had hoped or anticipated, which is due in
significant part to the fact that many courts have not been receptive to the
principles upon which the ADA is premised and have not helped to foster
promotion of those principles. Nevertheless, progress is being made.
First, the ADA has served to raise the expectations of people with
disabilities. People with disabilities now feel that they have the right to ask for
accommodations and to expect reasonable accommodations to be provided for
them. That is a necessary step toward changing societal attitudes. Experience has
shown that if people with disabilities sit passively and do not actively request or
demand necessary changes, society will not make the necessary changes of its
own volition.
Second, as previously noted, some people and entities are voluntarily
providing the accommodations required by the ADA, which has served to make
some segments of society accessible to some people with disabilities. As more
entities become aware of the lower-than-touted costs of many
accommodations, 153 more entities may begin to voluntarily provide such
accommodations.
152 See supra note 5.
15 3 See, e.g., Blanck, supra note 36 (citing studies showing the average cost of two-thirds
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Third, at least some courts are supporting the principles upon which the
ADA is founded and are enforcing the ADA. Furthermore, the regulatory
agencies responsible for enforcing Titles I through III of the Act have
consistently been making headway in enforcing the ADA.154
Fourth, the ADA has made society-at-large aware of the issue of disability,
and has required the public to devise means of making society more accessible
for people with disabilities in the future. In recognition of the fact that it is much
more expensive to retrofit facilities to make them accessible to persons with
disabilities rather than to build accessible facilities in the first instance, both
Titles II and I of the ADA require newly constructed and altered buildings and
facilities to be fully accessible to people with disabilities. 155 In this regard the
ADA is forward looking. A very significant benefit of the ADA, therefore, is that
it is helping to build a future society that will be more accessible to people with
disabilities.
Despite these positive effects of the ADA, the issue of societal backlash
remains of serious concern. At this point in time, society-at-large is not willing to
embrace the principle that people with disabilities should be provided with what
is generally viewed as "special entitlements" to achieve the goal of full
integration into society. To reduce the effects of societal backlash and to aid in
preventing further backtracking from the ADA's goals, individuals with
disabilities must give full recognition to the "reasonableness" premise of the
ADA's accommodation requirement. Thus, for example, an individual with a
disability should not refuse to take reasonable mitigating measures that would
substantially ameliorate the ramifications of that disability and then expect
employers or program administrators to provide costly, burdensome, or special
accommodations that would not be necessary if appropriate mitigating measures
were taken. The purpose of providing reasonable accommodations for
individuals with disabilities is to level the playing field for such individuals so
that they may have equal opportunity to engage in employment or programs. If
the individual could take mitigating measures to correct the disability to such
extent that the need for accommodations is obviated, the individual should not
of accommodations provided for employees with disabilities as less than $500).
154 Both the EEOC and the DOJ have negotiated untold numbers of settlements in cases
in which plaintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated in violation of the ADA. Under those
settlement agreements the defendants have willingly agreed to modify their practices and
procedures to comply with the tenets of the ADA. Settlement agreements and consent
judgments negotiated by the DOJ, for example, can be found at ADA Settlements and Consent
Agreements, at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/crtlada/settlemt.htm Oast modified Feb. 12,2001).
15542 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (1994) (Title I); 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (1999) (Title iI).
Similarly, the ADA requires that newly purchased buses and trains and newly built or acquired
transportation stations be accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. See e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 12142, 12162, 12182, 12184, 12186 (1994).
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refuse such mitigating measures and, at the same time, demand the provision of
accommodations. In such a situation, the accommodations requested are not
reasonable.
For example, some individuals who are deaf have embraced the concept of
"Deaf culture" and take the position that deafness is a culture rather than a
disability and that therefore "nothing is broken that needs to be fixed."156 Many
advocates of Deaf culture are strongly opposed to research geared toward curing
deafness, because they view such activities as a form of genocide which will lead
to the obliteration of the '"Deaf race." 157 Thus, for example, Deaf culturists
strongly oppose cochlear implants-a surgically implanted device that is capable
of permitting some people who are deaf to hear via electrically stimulated
electrodes placed inside the cochlea.1 58 Deaf culturists believe that they should
be able to refuse to have cochlear implants, or other restorative devices or
techniques that scientists may develop, such as nerve regeneration, even if such
devices or techniques would enable them to communicate normally in most
situations, including on the telephone. At the same time, however, Deaf culturists
assert the right to be protected under the ADA and other laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability and to require interpreters, telephone
relay services, 159 and other accommodations to be provided to enable their
participation in the workforce and in programs available to others.
156 For an extensive discussion of this issue, see BONNIE POrrRAs TUCKER, COCHLEAR
IMPLANrS: A HANDBOOK ch. 8 (1998) [hereinafter COCHLEAR IMPLANTS: A HANDBOOK]. See
also Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC Sept. 1993, at 37-53 [hereinafter
Deafness as Culture].
157 See generally COCHLEAR IMPLANTS: A HANDBOOK, supra note 157; Deafness as
Culture, supra note 156.
158 A cochlear implant is an electronic prostheses implanted into the inner ear that
partially performs the functions of the cochlea---the part "of the inner ear that transduces sound
waves into coded electrochemical signals." Thomas Balkany, A Brief Perspective on Cochlear
Implants, 328 N. ENG. J. MED. 281 (1993). The cochlear implant is intended to remedy many
of the effects of nerve deafness, the most common form of deafness. Id. Six to twenty-two
electrodes are implanted into the inner ear and are attached via a magnet and wires to an
extemal processor. In addition to the processor, the implanted person wears a microphone to
pick up sound. The external processor sends coded information to the prostheses in the inner
ear, which is a receiver-stimulator. The receiver-stimulator converts the coded information into
electrical signals, which are passed to the electrodes. The electrodes stimulate hearing nerve
fibers, and artificial sound is transmitted directly to the brain, bypassing the nonfuanctioning
portion of the ear. See e.g., Noel L. Cohen, et al., A Prospective, Randomized Study of
Cochlear Implants, 328 N. ENG. J. MED. 233 (1993); Michael F. Dorman, An Overview of
Cochlear Implants, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS: A HANDBOOK, supra note 156 at 5-28.
159 Deaf people may communicate on the telephone via use of a TDD-a
telecommunications device for the deaf. When using a TDD, the telephone receiver is placed
into two headset cups (similar to a modem) on a machine that resembles a small typewriter
with a video screen and/or paper printout. The TDD user types a message on a keyboard, which
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In the opinion of this author, such an attitude ignores the reasonableness
precept of the ADA's accommodation requirement. Congress enacted the ADA
to ensure that people with disabilities are not discriminated against "based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.' 60 Congress did not
intend to require employers and program administrators to incur costs or burdens
or to provide special assistance to accommodate individuals whose physical or
mental impairments may be corrected or substantially ameliorated by reasonable
mitigating measures, for such correctable impairments are not "beyond the
control of' such individuals. 161 This is not to say, of course, that an individual
should or could be required to take mitigating measures to ameliorate the
ramifications of a physical or mental impairment. An individual may always
refuse to take such mitigating measures. But it is unreasonable for an individual
who chooses to remain disabled, when reasonable measures can be taken to
ameliorate the disabling condition, to demand accommodations for that
disability. 162
is relayed to a party on the other end of the line with a similar device. The receiver returns his
or her message by typing it to the sender, and the conversation proceeds via typewriter and
video screen or printout.
Because most hearing people do not have TDDs, a relay service is required to allow TDD
users to communicate with non-TDD users. Thus, the TDD user calls a relay service, and a
relay operator answers via TDD and places the call to the non-TDD user (or vice-versa). The
operator then relays messages back and forth between the TDD and non-TDD users, typing
messages for the TDD user and speaking messages for the non-TDD user. Title IV of the ADA
requires all telephone services to provide 24 hour, seven day a week, relay services for
individuals with hearing or speech impairments. See ADA § 401(a)(3), (b), 47 U.S.C.
§ 225(a)(3), (b) (1994) (amending § 225(a) and (c) of the Communications Act).
160 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) (emphasis added).
161 This assumes, of course, that it is economically possible and medically advantageous,
after consideration of factors such as risk, side effects, and likelihood of permanent success of
the treatment at issue, for the individual to employ the mitigating measure. Whether mitigating
measures are medically feasible can be determined by looking to tort principles. In the tort
context, it is held that a plaintiff in a personal injury case cannot claim damages for a
"permanent injury" if the permanency of the injury could be avoided by reasonable medical
treatment. Whether submitting to surgery constitutes a "reasonable" mitigating measure
involves a determination of several factors, including the risk of the surgery, the pain involved,
the cost of the surgery, and the probability that the surgery will have successful results. See,
e.g., Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Or. 1973). In Hall v. Dumitru, MD., 620
N.E. 2d 668 (111. App. 1993), for example, the court held that the plaintiff had no duty to submit
to surgery to mitigate damages in her medical malpractice action where, inter alia, the surgery
presented risks of enhanced or additional injury or the prospect for the plaintiffs improved
health was slight.
162For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see COCHLEAR IMPLANrS: A
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To reduce the backlash effects of the ADA, advocates for disability rights
should also avoid overreaching by asserting the right of individuals with
disabilities to more than equal opportunity to participate in the mainstream of
society. Some commentators, for example, advocate for the requirement of job
set-asides to assist individuals with disabilities in joining the workforce.1 63
Professor Mark Weber argues that private employers should be required to set
aside a certain percentage ofjobs for employees with disabilities, for "something
more than the ADA, something even more than the Rehabilitation Act's
obligation of affirmative action by federal agencies and grantees, is needed to get
the bulk of the population of people with severe disabilities into ordinary
employment and out of poverty."164 A discussion of the substantive merits, or
lack thereof, of job set-asides is outside the scope of this paper. It is important
however, to mention briefly two significant reasons why such a requirement
would be unwise.
First the backlash effects ofjob set-asides are likely to be tremendous. A job
set-aside program constitutes an extreme form of affirmative action in favor of
people with disabilities, which has a tremendous impact on the nondisabled
population. Requiring that jobs be denied to people without disabilities in favor
of people with disabilities who may be less qualified than other applicants for
particular jobs may be the straw that breaks the camel's back in the area of
disability rights. The backlash arising from a job set-aside program is likely to
make the current strong backlash against the ADA look tame in retrospect. The
courts have proved to be uncomfortable with the notion of reasonable
accommodations, because they view such accommodations as a form of
affirmative action, and courts are uncomfortable with notions of affirmative
action. Establishment of new disability policy that requires blatant affirmative
action-by requiring job set-asides or otherwise-will serve to reinforce the
backlash against such affirmative treatment of individuals with disabilities,
whether that affirmative treatment is in the form of reasonable accommodations
or otherwise.
Second, job set-aside programs constitute a form of charitable assistance, in
that people with disabilities are entitled to X number of jobs regardless of
qualifications, which reinforces the abhorrent and socially unproductive
HANDBOOK, supra note 156. It is important to note, however, that an individual's refusal to
take mitigating measures should bear relevance to the question of whether it is reasonable to
provide accommodations for that individual to allow integration into the mainstream. It should
not bear relevance to the question of whether the individual is disabled and thus protected by
the ADA and other laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. For a discussion
of this distinction, see supra note 52.
163 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Employment: A
Non-Retrospective, 52 ALA. L. REv. 375, at Part m.c. (2000).
164Id
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perception that individuals with disabilities are poor souls in need of charitable
assistance. 165 To give voice to this outmoded charitable model of disability,
rejected by Congress when enacting the ADA, would eviscerate the significant
precept on which the ADA is based. That is, people with disabilities want, and
have the right, to be treated in accord with their abilities rather than in accord
with their disabilities. The damage that would result from such conceptual
backtracking with respect to disability policy is so extensive as to be
incalculable. 166
IV. CONCLUSION
In hindsight, it appears that premising the ADA on civil rights premises in
general, and on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in particular, may have in many
respects served to hamper, rather than promote, the ADA's objectives. There is
no immediate means of solving this problem. Given the current political climate
encompassing a general disfavor of civil rights concepts, it would be unwise to
ask Congress to amend the ADA at this juncture. Indeed, Congress might be
more apt to lessen the protections granted by the ADA rather than to increase
those protections. Significant changes in the manner in which people with
disabilities are treated, therefore, must result from changing societal attitudes
rather than from immediate modification of the ADA. Continuing efforts must be
undertaken to educate both the courts and. the public-at-large about the true
meaning of civil rights for people with disabilities.
When enacting the ADA Congress recognized that the traditional civil rights
model does not serve to provide equal opportunities for people with disabilities.
Thus, Congress altered or expanded the traditional civil rights model by requiring
that reasonable accommodations be provided for individuals with disabilities.
Because of the differences between the structures of the nondiscrimination
mandates of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress might have
been wiser to state that the ADA was premised on basic "human rights"
principles, rather than stating that the ADA was premised on existing civil rights
principles. Congress did not forthrightly explain the precepts on which the ADA
was based, however, and thus it is left to disability rights advocates to make the
courts and the public understand that the provision of reasonable
165 See supra note 3.
166By way of example, (1) employers will no longer be required to view and treat
applicants and employees with disabilities in the same manner that they view and treat
applicants and employees without disabilities, and (2) employers might refuse to hire people
with disabilities who were qualified for jobs because they had already satisfied their job set-
aside "quotas."
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accommodations-albeit a form of affirmative action-constitutes a necessary
component of civil rights for individuals with disabilities.
Despite the ADA's flaws, the Act to date has had numerous positive
ramifications for people with disabilities. While the progress resulting from the
ADA has been slower than many people had anticipated, progress is ongoing,
and will continue hopefully to be ongoing. However, the June 1999 Supreme
Court decisions in Sutton v. United Airlines, Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., and Albertsons v. Kirkingburg167 are disheartening. Additionally, the
possibility that the Supreme Court might eviscerate portions of the ADA in a
case considering whether Congress validly exercised its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating state immunity from ADA lawsuits is
frightening. 168 In light of the disturbing manner in which the Supreme Court
decided its June 1999 trilogy of cases,169 it is unclear exactly how far the Court
will go in expressing its dissatisfaction with, or lack of understanding of, the
ADA's underlying precepts.
167 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive article discussing the
flaws in the Court's reasoning in those cases see Tucker, supra note 52.
168 See supra note 53.
169 See Tucker, supra note 52.
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